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This dissertation examines, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of international
policies, especially of sanctions, on conflicts. In theoretical analysis, we consider conflicts
(both civil and inter-state) related to natural resources and examine how sanctions on
natural resource exports affect the intensity of conflicts. However, for the empirical
analysis, we consider only the civil conflicts and examine how international sanctions affect
the duration of civil conflicts.
In chapter 1, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model on the relationship
between natural resources and civil conflicts. Contrary to the most of the existing
literature, we assume that resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous during the
conflict. We find that the effects of current international sanctions on civil conflict depend
critically on whether the budget constraints of the warring groups are binding or
non-binding, and whether wage rate is exogenous or endogenous. Under both binding and
non-binding budgets, the current sanction can be counter-productive. However, a threat of
future sanction reduces conflict intensity, when the budget constraint is non-binding. An
improvement in agricultural productivity may also limit the conflict. Our results also
suggest that the most effective policy for conflict resolution would be bilateral piece-meal
reduction in war efforts.
Chapter 2 develops a two-period general equilibrium model linking natural resources
to inter-state conflict, treating resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous. First, we
characterize the war equilibrium and derive a number of properties of it. Second, we
i
examine the effects of different types of trade sanctions imposed by the international
community on war efforts of the two countries. We find that a temporary current sanction
on both countries, or even on one of the countries, will be counter-productive, and an
anticipated future sanction on both countries will unambiguously reduce war intensity.
Whether an anticipated future sanction on one of the countries will reduce war intensity
will depend on the level of resource stock; the effect of a permanent sanction on both
countries is ambiguous: war intensities will fall only if the resource stocks of the countries
are sufficiently high.
Finally, in chapter 3, we examine empirically the effects of international sanctions on
the expected duration of civil conflicts. Contrary to the most of the previous findings, we
find that international sanctions reduce the expected duration of civil conflicts. Our finding
is robust for different controls, different parametric models, and with consideration of
endogeneity of sanctions. However, not all types of sanctions are equally successful in
shortening conflicts. Total economic embargoes and arms sanctions are effective, but trade
sanctions, aid suspension, and other sanctions do not work. We also find that both
multi-lateral and unilateral sanctions (mainly U.S. sanctions) can reduce duration of civil
wars.
ii
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CHAPTER 1
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIVIL CONFLICTS: POLICY ANALYSIS
UNDER GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II almost a third of all nations has experienced civil wars,
defined as intra-state war with more than 1000 battle death in a single year (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010). The number of armed conflict rose steadily through the last half of
twentieth century, peaking in the early 1990s, and then has been showing a declining trend
(see Figure 1.1 in page 2). Most of these conflicts are intra-state or civil conflicts. Note,
the incidence of civil war has been the highest in Africa, the world’s poorest continent.
During the last 60 years, civil conflicts have been associated with approximately 20 million
deaths (Besley and Persson, 2008). Civil wars also destroy physical infrastructure and
human capital, weaken the rule of law, displace hundreds of thousands of people, and cause
the spread of pandemics (Crost et al., 2014). The internal conflict is not only pervasive, it
is also persistent. Almost 70% of all conflicts took place in countries where multiple
conflicts were recorded (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004). According to the World Development
Report (2011), a civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of
GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in
overcoming poverty. The effects of death, destruction, and delayed development due to
conflicts spill over both regionally and globally.
The abundance of natural resources has been blamed for civil conflicts in different
parts of the world. Some analysts argue that natural resources are not only the lucrative
prize for winner of the conflict, but also are used as source of funding during the conflict.
Revenues from natural resource exports allow warring groups to hire soldiers and finance
other costs of war (World Bank, 2003; Ross, 2004; Lujala et al., 2005; UN, 2005;
Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). In just the past two decades, seven African countries
1
Figure 1.1: Number of Armed Conflict by Year and Type, 1946-2013
Source: UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset. An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
have endured brutal civil conflicts fueled by diamonds: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the
Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Other examples include: gemstones have been linked to civil wars in
Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia; drugs like opium and coca have fueled
civil wars in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, and Peru; timber has played a vital role in
the civil wars in Cambodia, Liberia, and the Republic of Congo; several oil producing states
have experienced civil wars, including Angola, Colombia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan (Le
Billon, 2000; World Bank, 2003; Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Janus, 2012).
Many scholars have studied empirically the relationship between natural resources
and civil war since the publication of the seminal paper by Coller & Hoefller (1998).1 Why
resources lead to civil war? Many analysts relied on incentive based theories on resource
and war, arguing that the revenues available from resources give the actors a financial
1Some of the important studies are Fearon & Latin (2003), Fearon (2004, 2005), Collier & Hoefller (2004),
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005), Collier et al. (2009), Estenban et al. (2011).
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incentive to initiate conflict. Collier and Hoefller (2004) distinguish between two motives of
civil wars: grievance and greed. Grievances usually emerge from inequality in terms of
political and economic rights, inequality of income and wealth, and ethnic or religious
divisions. These types of grievances may cause civil war between different groups in a
society. However, economists and a growing number of social scientists have lately come to
analyze civil wars as a competition between warlords for the appropriation of valuable
resources (i.e., greed). Using data of civil wars from 1960 to 1999, Collier & Hoeﬄer (2004)
find that greed motives have a greater explanatory power than grievances to explain the
onset and intensity of civil war.2 In our study, we also consider that the motive of conflict
is to capture resources.
Contrary to the huge number of empirical literature, only few theoretical literature
has been developed on the linkage between natural resources and civil conflicts.3 Most of
these papers focus on how natural resource stocks induce the rent seeking and
appropriative activities and hence affect the economy. For example, Torvick (2002)
develops a simple model to show how abundance of natural resources increases rent seeking
activities and leads to lower welfare for the country. Using a static model of conflict
between rulers of urban sector and peasants of rural sector, Olssson and Fors (2004) show
how different factors including natural resource abundance affect the intensity of conflict.
They use the model to explain the Congolese civil wars. Holder (2006) develops a static
model of conflict and demonstrates that the impact of natural resource abundance might
differ among countries depending on the degree of fractionalization in population. His
2One fundamental question is why the groups fight at all. If they are rational, they should prefer a
bargaining solution to destructive conflict. Theories of conflict consider three reasons for a rational war.
First, asymmetric information - neither agent knows the military capacity of the other. If both agents are
over-optimistic, there may not be a peaceful outcome that both recognize as mutually beneficial. Second,
commitment problems - especially the inability of the parties to commit to deals in the absence of third
party enforcer. Third, issue indivisibilities - whereby some issues do not admit compromise (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010).
3However, there are significant number of theoretical literature on the issue of conflict in general e.g.,
Brito and Intriligator (1985), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Hirshleifer (1995), Grossman and Kim
(1996), Neary (1997), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002), and Garfnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2008), Lahiri (2010).
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model predicts that natural resources lower income in fractionalized countries, but increase
income in homogenous countries. Olsson (2007) uses a two period model of conflict
between rulers and rivals to show that natural resource (specifically diamond) abundance
negatively affects economic growth of countries with weak institutions. Wick (2008)
develops a Stackelberg model of conflict in which rulers move first and the general people
move second. She finds that the relationship between conflict intensity and resource rent is
non-monotonic, and that the economy’s growth rate may be affected by the resource
abundance. Instead of using static model, Maxwell and Reuveny (2005) develop a dynamic
model to explain continuous conflict over renewable resources between two rival groups.
Morelli and Rohner (2015) show that the geographic location of resource deposits also
affects conflict. They demonstrate that civil wars are more likely if the resources are
relatively abundant in regions of ethnic minorities.
Most of the existing theoretical models treat natural resource stock as exogenous
conflict prize in analyzing conflict. But, in reality natural resources can be extracted and
sold during the conflict. One hypothesis about rebellion is that rebels may consider
rebellion as business and their main motive is to capture or loot resources during the
conflict (Collier et al., 2004). Rebel groups often rely upon the plunder of natural resources
to sustain conflict financially.4 Thus, resource extraction may be endogenous during the
conflict.5
In this chapter, we develop a two-period three-sector general equilibrium model
relating natural resources to civil (or intra-state) conflicts, and examines how international
policies including sanctions on resource exports affect conflicts. Contrary to the most of
the existing literature, we assume that resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous
during the conflict. We develop a model of non-ethnic civil conflict, where two warlords
4Examples include: in Cambodia, Khmer Rouge used revenue from timber and gemstone sale to maintain
the military force in the early 1990s (Le Billon, 2000); in Liberia, rebel forces led by Charles Taylor raised
money from the sale of timber (Ross, 2004a).
5In recent time, Janus (2012), and Ploeg and Rohner (2012) develop models of civil conflicts, where they
consider natural resource extraction as endogenous during the conflict.
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possess some initial resource stocks and fight with each other to capture more resources.
We consider that two warlords fight for some labor-intensive resources.6 The examples of
labor-intensive resources are gemstones, drugs, timber, coffee, forests, fisheries etc. Most of
these resources are renewable, geographically spread, and require large amount of labor to
extract.7
In our model, in the first period two warlords extract resources and fight with each
other. If a warlord wins the war, in the second period he/she gets the remaining resource
stock. Each warlord hires labor from competitive labor market for two purposes:
extraction of resources and fighting. Each warlord also uses the resource revenue to finance
the costs of extraction and costs of war. Depending on the revenue and costs, budget
constraint of each warlord might me binding or non-binding. In our model, there is also a
third sector, which we call agriculture sector and is separate from the war sector.
Agriculture sector also hires labor from competitive labor market.
Note, our model is similar to that of Janus (2012), but with important differences.
Janus (2012) also develops a two-period three-sector model with endogenous resource
extraction. However, there are at least three differences between Janus’s model and our
one. First, while Janus considers conflict between two social groups, we consider conflict
between two warlords.8 Second, while in his model agricultural sector is directly related to
the war sector, in our model agricultural sector is separate from the war sector. Finally, in
Janus’s model two warring groups use their own labor, but in our model warlords and
agricultural sector hire labor from competitive labor market, which makes the wage rate
6By labor-intensive resource we mean the resources that can be extracted by labor-intensive method.
7In Liberia and Sierra Leone, different types resources (e.g. rubber, timber, diamonds, and iron ore) and
their geographical spread have lead to development of warlords and highly fragmented conflicts between a
weak government and numerous armed groups controlling resources (Addison et al., 2002). A few studies
show that even if gemstones and drugs are not linked to the onset of a conflict, these resources tend to
lengthen the pre-existing conflict. Availability of these easily marketable resources also makes it harder to
implement peace accord among warring parties (Ross, 2004a).
8This framework conforms to the warlord competition in weak African states (Reno, 1998 & 2002). There
are many examples of warlords in Africa at different times e.g., Idi Amin & Joseph Kony (Uganda), Milton
Blahy & Charles Taylor (Liberia), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Tomas Lubanga (DRC), Jean-Bedal Bokassa
(CAF), Bosco Ntaganda (Rwanda).
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endogenous. In general, our model is different from existing models in several ways, which
are discussed below.
First, most of the existing models consider civil war between two ethnic groups (one
group might be ruler, other group is rebel), who have own labor-force and they use those
labors either in war or in productive activities. These models often treat the group as a
unitary actor, ignoring the problem of collective action. But, there should be some
incentives for the members of a group to participate in the war. Such incentives might
include wages, opportunities to loot, promises of future reward, or physical protection from
harm (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).9 To solve the problem of collective action, we consider
war between two warlords, each of whom form a group by hiring labor from competitive
labor market.10 The market wage rate is a proxy for reward to join in the group.
Second, most of the existing models consider a partial equilibrium framework in
analyzing civil conflict. They consider that all agents in the economy engage in war, they
do not consider the possibility that there may be some peaceful agents or sectors in the
economy that are separate from the war sector. In our model, we consider a separate
agriculture sector, which is controlled by a landlord and is not directly related to the war
sector.11 Thus, we consider a general equilibrium framework as opposed to partial
equilibrium framework of the existing literature.
Third, conflict literature so far ignored the role labor market in conflict. But, in
reality most of the conflicts involve large number of labor force, which may be transferred
from productive sectors of the economy and affect the wage rate. Thus, wage rate may not
be fixed during the war, rather may be endogenously determined in the labor market. In
our model, wage rate rate is endogenously determined by war sector and agricultural sector.
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the policy options for international
9Weinstein (2007) also shows that in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Peru rebel fighters were remunerated
with looting of civilian property and drug sales.
10Grossman (1991, 1999) and Gates (2002) also consider this type of micro-economic approach of rebellion
in which private gain motivates decisions.
11In fact, this can represent any sector other than the war sector, like manufacturing sector.
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community to resolve the civil conflicts related to natural resources. On the basis of our
comparative static results, we analyze the effects of some important policies on the
intensity of civil wars. First, international community frequently imposes sanctions on
natural resource exports from conflict zone, which is known as ‘blood diamond’ policy.12
Our results suggest that when the budget constraint is non-binding, a temporary current
sanction is always counter-productive. However, in this case, a credible threat of future
sanction will reduce the conflict intensity. Our results also suggest that a current sanction
on resource exports will reduce the conflict intensity, when the budget constraint of each
warring group is binding and wage rate is fixed. Note, Janus (2012) also finds the same
result for the binding constraint case. However, we show that if wage rate is endogenous
and there are limited opportunities of employment in alternative sectors, such as in
agricultural sector, the conflict intensity may increase due to sanction, even when the
budget constraint is binding. Thus, unlike Janus (2012), we show that sanctions might be
counter-productive with binding budget constraint. Second, our results suggest that the
most effective policy for conflict resolution would be bilateral piecemeal reduction in war
efforts. Regardless of whether budget constraint binds or not, a mutual reduction in war
efforts by the warring groups increase their welfare. Thus, if international community can
negotiate with the warring groups and can convince them that both will be benefited by
reducing the conflict efforts, conflict intensity may diminish. This result supports the
conventional wisdom that diplomatic solution is the best to resolve any conflict. Third, we
find that an improvement in agricultural productivity may reduce conflict intensity. An
increase in productivity will increase the labor demand in agricultural sector, which in turn
can increase wage rate and can limit the conflict. A final option would be to destroy the
physical resource stocks for which the groups are fighting. But, it is very difficult for
international community to apply this policy, and it may decrease the post-conflict welfare.
12For example, sanctions have targeted countries experiencing civil war, such as Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan,
Lebanon, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia (Escriba`-Folch, 2010). Diamond embargo was imposed on warring
groups of Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola to end conflicts related to diamond (Wallensteen
et al., 2006).
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However, in extreme situations, international community may apply this policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a model of
natural resource and conflict, and its’ solution. Section 1.3 shows and analyses the
comparative statics for exogenous shocks or policy changes. Section 1.4 illustrates the
effects of piecemeal reduction in war efforts. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 THE MODEL
Suppose, there are two risk-neutral warlords in an economy, who own and control some
natural resource stocks, like gemstone, drugs, timber etc. Both warlords are motivated by
the greed and so they fight with each other to capture more resources.13 Each warlord
forms a group and hires labor from competitive labor market for two purposes: extraction
of resources and fighting. Consider two periods: in the first period, two groups extract
resources and fight with each other; and if a group wins the war, in the second period, it
gets remaining resource stock. Each warlord uses the resource revenues to finance the costs
of extraction and costs of war. Depending on the levels of revenues and costs, the budget
constraint of each warlord might be binding or non-binding. We also consider that there is
a part of the economy that is not affected directly by the conflict. In particular, there is a
landlord in the economy, and she produces agricultural goods by hiring labor from a
competitive labor market. Thus, we consider a general equilibrium framework. In the
following section we set up the model.
1.2.1 THE BASIC MODEL
Let warlord i, i=1,2, possesses an initial resource stock yi, and hires lri amount of labor for
extraction and lci amount of labor for fighting a war. The resource extraction function is
for simplicity given by: ri = 2l
1
2
ri. This function implies that extraction is diminishing with
13We implicitly assume that there is no formal government in the economy, who can secure property rights.
Due to the absence of governance and enforcement, ownership and control of resources is settled by open
conflict or, equivalently by the threat of conflict.
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the amount of labor. Group i′s winning probability in war is given by the conventional
ratio-form contest success function: qi = lci/(lci + lcj), j 6= i.14 This function implies that
for given amount of conflict labor of group j, the winning probability of group i increases
with its’ conflict labor and vice versa. The landlord, who produces agricultural goods, hires
la amount of labor from the labor market. The agricultural production function is given
by: A = 2l
1
2
a V
1
2 , where V is a fixed amount of land available to the landlord. Labors move
freely between sectors and as a result wage rate is same in all sectors.
The net expected return of warlord i in two periods is given by:
Ri = p1ri − (wlri + wlci) + qip2(yi + yj − ri − rj)
= p1(2l
1
2
ri)− (wlri + wlci) +
lci
lci + lcj
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj), i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
(1.1)
where p1 is the current international market price of resources, w is the wage rate, and
p1ri − (wlri + wlci) is the net revenue in period 1. The expected world market price of
resources in period 2 is p2, and (yi + yj − ri − rj) is the resource stock that group i gets at
the beginning of the 2nd period, if it wins the war. For simplicity, we also assume no
discounting for period 2. Since qi is the probability of winning for group i in the conflict,
the expected revenue of the group in the 2nd period is qip2(yi + yj − ri − rj).
The warlord i maximizes expected return subject to the budget constraint. Since we
assume that resource revenues are used to finance the costs of war, the budget constraint
for each warlord can be written as: p1ri ≥ (wlri + wlci), i = 1, 2.
The landlord also maximizes profit and the profit function is given by:
Ra = pa(2l
1
2
a V
1
2 )− wla, (1.2)
where pa is the market price of agricultural goods.
Suppose, the economy has a fixed supply of labor, denoted by L. The demand for
labor comes from three sectors: resource extraction, conflict, and agricultural sector. Thus,
14Many authors use this type of contest success function e.g., Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas
(1996), Ploeg & Rohner(2012).
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the labor market equilibrium condition is as follows:
lr1 + lr2 + lc1 + lc2 + la = L. (1.3)
Equations (1.1) to (1.3) describe our model. Now we will find the equilibrium
conditions of the agents in our model.
1.2.2 EQUILIBRIUM
Consider that two warlords play a simultaneous move game. That is, each warlord i
maximizes the following Lagrangian function taking the extraction labor and conflict labor
of other warlord as given:
max
lri,lci,γi
Li = p1(2l
1
2
ri)− (wlri + wlci) +
lci
lci + lcj
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj)
+ γi[p1(2l
1
2
ri)− (wlri + wlci)], i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
(1.4)
where γi is the Lagrangian multiplier. The constraint above specifies that extraction and
conflict is funded by selling extracted resources.
We consider two possible cases regarding the budget constraint: budget constraint is
binding, and budget constraint is non-binding. First, assuming binding constraint, the
optimality conditions or first order conditions for lri, lci, and γi (i = 1, 2) are respectively:
15
p1(1 + γi)l
− 1
2
ri = w(1 + γi) +
lci
lci + lcj
p2l
− 1
2
ri (1.5)
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj) = w(1 + γi) (1.6)
p1(2l
1
2
ri) = wlri + wlci (1.7)
Equation (1.5) implies that marginal benefit of extraction labor (in the left hand side)
must equal marginal cost of extraction labor (in the right hand side). Marginal benefit of
extraction equals the value of marginal product of extraction labor, while marginal cost
equals wage cost of labor plus opportunity cost of extracting now instead of conserve it for
15Variation in yi, i = 1, 2, across warlords means generally that we cannot rule out the possibility that
one of the two agents will extract all resources in the first period so that ri = yi. However, to focus on the
issue of concern, we assume an interior optimum. Note, for an interior equilibrium to exist any asymmetry
between two warlords in initial resource stock yi needs to be small.
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the future. The opportunity cost of extraction is equal to the probability of winning the
conflict times the value of marginal product of labor in period 2. Equation (1.6) equates
the marginal benefit of labor in conflict, which is the change in the likelihood of winning
times the prize of winning the conflict, to the marginal cost of labor in conflict. Note, if
budget constraint is binding, the value of resource in period 1 will exceed market price p1
and will be equal to p1(1 + γi), where γi is the shadow value of increased extraction as it
loosens the constraint. Similarly, cost of labor exceeds the market wage rate w and it is
equal to w(1 + γi). Equation (1.7) shows the binding budget constraint that total labor
costs of extraction and conflict cannot exceed the total revenue from extraction.
For simplicity of the analysis, we assume that two groups are symmetric (i.e.,
y1 = y2). If two groups are symmetric, the first order conditions for each group become:
p1(1 + γ)l
− 1
2
r = w(1 + γ) +
1
2
p2l
− 1
2
r (1.8)
1
2lc
p2(y − 2l
1
2
r ) = w(1 + γ) (1.9)
p1(2l
1
2
r ) = wlr + wlc (1.10)
Using equations (1.8) to (1.10) we get following two equations:
4p1l
1
2
r − 3wlr + wyl
1
2
r = p1y (1.11)
lc =
2p1l
1
2
r
w
− lr (1.12)
In this case, we don’t have explicit solutions for lr and lc. However, we have implicit
solutions in terms of parameters and wage rate: lr(p1, w, y) and lc(p1, w, y).
Now consider that the budget constraint is non-binding, i.e., γi = 0. Then, under
symmetry the first order conditions become:
p1l
− 1
2
r = w +
1
2
p2l
− 1
2
r (1.13)
1
2lc
p2(y − 2l
1
2
r ) = w (1.14)
From equations (1.13) and (1.14), we get the interior optimal (Nash-equilibrium) values of
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lr and lc as follows:
lr =
(2p1 − p2)2
4w2
, lc =
p2[wy − (2p1 − p2)]
2w2
Note, lr > 0, if and only if p1 >
1
2
p2; and lc > 0, if and only if y > (2p1 − p2)/w, or y > r.16
In this economy, the landlord also maximizes her revenue by hiring labor from labor
market. From (1.2) we get the first order condition for profit maximization of the landlord
as follows:
pal
− 1
2
a V
1
2 = w (1.15)
Equation (1.15) implies that in equilibrium marginal benefit of agricultural labor (equal to
the value of marginal product of labor) must be equal to marginal cost of labor (equal to
wage rate). From (1.15) we get the optimal value of la as:
la =
p2aV
w2
> 0
If there is full employment in the economy, then wage rate is endogenous. The wage
rate is determined by the labor market equilibrium condition. With two symmetric warring
groups the labor market equilibrium condition is as follows:
2lr + 2lc + la = L (1.16)
Equation (1.16) determines the wage rate of labor in this economy.
1.3 COMPARATIVE STATICS: POLICY ANALYSIS
In this section, we shall examine how exogenous shocks or policy changes affect the conflict.
One frequently applied international policy instrument to reduce civil conflict is imposing
sanctions on resource exports from conflict zone (known as blood diamond policy). For
example, in 1992 UN Security Council proposed a ban on timber shipped from Cambodia
to Thailand to limit the funding of rebel group Khmer Rouge who was controlling the
forests near Thai border (Janus, 2012). The UN Security Council also took measures
16In equilibrium r = 2l
1
2
r = 2
√
(2p1 − p2)2/4w2 = (2p1 − p2)/w.
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against the rebel forces in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and
Angola (Ross, 2004). The most prominent example of blood diamond is the Kimberly
Process Certification Scheme (took effect in 2003) that targets the trade in rough diamond
based on the perception that diamond had fueled civil wars in different parts of the world,
especially in Africa. However, most of the empirical literature about the effectiveness of
sanctions suggest that sanctions are not generally successful in reducing conflict. Here, we
examine theoretically how the sanctions on resource exports affect conflict intensity.
A sanction on resource exports reduces the export price of resource received by the
sanctioned country. Thus, we will examine how war efforts of the warring groups change
with the change in resource price. We consider different types of sanctions on resource
exports: temporary sanction (sanction on period 1 only), sanction threat or expected
future sanction (sanction on period 2 only), and permanent sanction (sanction on both
periods). We also examine how war efforts change with the change in agricultural price or
productivity, and with the exogenous change in resource stock. We shall do these
comparative static exercises separately for two cases: when the budget constraint is
non-binding, and when the budget constraint is binding. In each case, first we examine
how optimal choices of lr, lc, and la change with exogenous changes in parameters
(p1, p2, pa, y), and then we discuss policy implications of the findings.
1.3.1 BUDGET CONSTRAINT NON-BINDING
We consider two sub-scenarios for the economy: 1) when there is unemployment in the
economy (the wage rate is fixed), and 2) when there is full employment in the economy
(the wage rate is endogenous).
1.3.1.1 UNEMPLOYMENT
In many conflict-prone developing countries unemployment is a common phenomenon.
When there is unemployment in the economy, wage rate (w) is fixed. Then the conflict
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sector and non-conflict sector are not connected with each other. That is, our model can be
called partial equilibrium one. Now we shall analyze what happens to equilibrium choices
of lr and lc, when the parameters p1, p2, w, and y change exogenously. We derive the
following proposition from comparative static analysis.
Proposition 1: When the budget constraint is not binding and there is
unemployment in the economy so that wage rate is fixed, (a) a temporary rise in resource
price increases extraction and decreases conflict; (b) an increase in expected future price of
resource decreases extraction and increases conflict; (c) a permanent rise in resource price
increases extraction, and it increases conflict provided that resource stock is sufficiently
high; (d) a rise in physical resource stock does not affect extraction, but it increases
conflict; (e) an exogenous increase in wage rate decreases extraction, and it decreases
conflict only if resource stock is sufficiently high.
Proof of proposition 1:
(a) Change in p1: Differentiating optimal values of lr and lc with respect to p1 we get,
∂lr
∂p1
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
2p1 − p2
w2
> 0 (1.17)
∂lc
∂p1
= − p2
w2
< 0 (1.18)
Note, 2p1 − p2 > 0 is necessary condition for lr > 0 (see equation 1.13).
A temporary rise in the resource price in the current period leads to hiring more
labor for extraction. This is logical because a rise in resource price increases the marginal
benefit of extraction labor. However, a temporary rise in resource price decreases conflict
labor. This is because increases in current extraction decreases the future prize of conflict,
which causes the reduction of conflict labor.
The proposition 1(a) suggests that when budget constraint of the warring groups are
non-binding and there is unemployment in the economy, a temporary sanction on resource
exports would be counter-productive. Thus, a temporary sanction intensifies conflict. This
is because when budget constraint is not binding, each warring group reduces current
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extraction of resources facing the lower international price due to sanction. As a result,
more resources are left for the future and the warring group increases the fighting efforts to
capture that bigger resource stock.
(b) Change in p2: Differentiating optimal values of lr and lc with respect to p2 we get,
∂lr
∂p2
= −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(2p1 − p2)
2w2
< 0 (1.19)
∂lc
∂p2
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy + 2p2 − 2p1)
2w2
> 0, (1.20)
Note, lc > 0 implies wy + p2 − 2p1 > 0, which in turn implies wy + 2p2 − 2p1 > 0.
A rise in the future price of resource increases the opportunity cost of extraction in
the current period, which causes to reduction in extraction. However, an increase in future
price of resource increases the conflict both directly and indirectly. First, a rise in future
price increases the prize of conflict, which induces more conflict. Second, the fall in
extraction raises the conflict prize further and thus causes more hiring of conflict labor.
The proposition 1(b) suggests that a credible sanction threat that implies an
expected future sanction (after the conflict ends in our model) reduces the intensity of
conflict. An expected future sanction reduces the price of resources in the second period in
our model, which reduces the reward of conflict. Facing the reduction of future price, the
warring groups also increase resource extraction in the current period, which reduces the
conflict prize further. For both reasons the conflict intensity falls.
(c) Change in p (p1 = p2 = p): Differentiating optimal values of lr and lc with respect
to p we get,
∂lr
∂p
=
(
∂lr
∂p1
+
∂lr
∂p2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
=
p
w2
− p
2w2
=
p
2w2
> 0 (1.21)
∂lc
∂p
=
(
∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂p2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
= − p
w2
+
y
2w
=
wy − 2p
2w2
(1.22)
From equation (1.22) we see that ∂lc/∂p > 0, if and only if y > 2p/w, or y > 2r.
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17If p1 = p2 = p, lr = p
2/4w2, r = 2l
1
2
r = 2
√
p2/4w2 = p/w.
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A permanent rise in resource price increases both marginal benefit (in the current
period) and marginal cost (in the future) of extraction, but marginal benefit increases more
compare to marginal cost.18 A permanent increase in resource price increases the future
conflict prize which increases conflict labor, but a price rise also increases extraction which
reduces conflict labor (as more extraction reduces conflict prize). Which effect will
dominate depends on the initial level of resource stock relative to current extraction. If the
resource stock is high enough that it is greater than twice of current extraction, then the
conflict labor increases because lot of resources are left for the future. However, if the
resource stock is less than twice of the current level of extraction, then the conflict labor
decreases because little amount of resources are left for future.
The proposition 1(c) implies that a permanent sanction on resource exports that
reduces both the current and future prices of resources, reduces the conflict intensity only if
the resource stock is sufficiently high.
(d) Change in y: Differentiating optimal values of lr and lc with respect to y we get,
∂lr
∂y
= 0 (1.23)
∂lc
∂y
=
p2
2w
> 0 (1.24)
A rise in the physical resource stock does not affect extraction labor, but increases
conflict labor. When the budget constraint is not binding, then warlords do not need to
change the extraction level even if the resource stock changes. However, a greater resource
stock implies greater conflict prize, which induces more conflict. This result is consistent
with most of the empirical findings that natural resource rich countries are likely to
experience more civil wars, which is particularly true for many African countries.
This proposition suggests that a decrease in physical resource stock reduces the
conflict. But, it is very difficult for international community to apply this policy, it will
also decrease post-conflict welfare. However, in extreme situation international community
18In this case marginal benefit increases by p/w2, but marginal cost increases by p/2w2 (where 1/2 is
winning probability). Thus, net increase in benefit is p/2w2.
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may apply this policy. For example, recently a U.S.-led coalition force tried to destroy oil
refineries controlled by notorious ISIS group of Iraq and Syria to limit their funding from
selling oil in the black market (International Business Times, Sept. 30, 2014).19
(e) Change in w: Differentiating optimal values of lr and lc with respect to w we get,
∂lr
∂w
= −(2p1 − p2)
2
2w3
< 0 (1.25)
∂lc
∂w
=
p2[2(2p1 − p2)− wy]
2w3
(1.26)
In this case, ∂lc/∂w < 0, if and only if y > 2(2p1 − p2)/w, or y > 2r.
An increase in wage rate, which increases the marginal cost of extraction labor,
decreases the labor in extraction. On the other hand, an increase in wage rate may increase
or decrease conflict labor. An increase in wage rate increases the marginal cost of conflict
labor, which reduces the demand for conflict labor. However, a reduction in extraction
associated with wage increase tend to increase the demand for conflict labor. Which effect
will dominate depends on the level of resource stock. If the resource stock is sufficiently
high, the negative effect will dominate the positive effect, as a result conflict labor will fall
due to rise in wage. The necessary condition for this to happen is that initial resource
stock is greater than twice of current extraction in our model. The implication of this
result is that even an exogenous increase in wage rate does not guarantee the reduction in
conflict intensity.
1.3.1.2 FULL EMPLOYMENT
When there is full employment in the economy, wage rate is endogenous. Now exogenous
shocks may affect the wage rate through labor market. Any change in the agricultural
sector also affects the decisions of warlords through labor market. Thus, this is a general
equilibrium framework. The wage rate will be determined by the labor market equilibrium
condition. Substituting the optimal values of lr, lc, and la in to the labor market
19Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is
a Sunni, extremist, unrecognized state and self-proclaimed caliphate based in the Middle East. The group
currently controls a large area in both Iraq and Syria.
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equilibrium condition of (1.16) we get:
2p2wy − 2w2L+ 4p21 + 3p22 − 8p1p2 + 2p2aV = 0 (1.27)
The equation (1.27) determines equilibrium wage rate as a function of exogenous
variables. However, we don’t have explicit solution for wage rate in this case. From
equation (1.27) we get the changes in w with respect to the changes in p1, p2, pa, y, and L
as follows: (see appendix A.1 for derivation)
dw
dp1
= −4w(p1 − p2)
∆︸︷︷︸
−
,
dw
dp2
= −w(wy + 3p2 − 4p1)
∆︸︷︷︸
−
,
dw
dp
=
(
dw
dp1
+
dw
dp2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
= −w
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − p)
∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dpa
= −2wpaV
∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dy
= −w
2p2
∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dL
=
2w3
∆︸︷︷︸
−
< 0,
(1.28)
where ∆ = (2p1 − p2)(3p2 − 2p1)− p2wy − 2p2aV < 0 for the stability of excess demand
function of labor. Note, dw/dp1 > 0, if and only if p1 > p2; and dw/dp2 > 0, if and only if
(wy + 3p2 − 4p1) > 0 (the sufficient condition is y > 2r).
An increase in current price increases extraction labor, but reduces conflict labor. If
current and expected future prices are same, a temporary change in resource price changes
both extraction labor and conflict labor by the same amount, leaving the wage unaffected.
If current price is higher than expected future prices, a temporary rise in price causes an
increase in extraction labor more compared to reduction in conflict labor, which in turn
increases wage rate, and vice versa. An expected increase in future price may increase or
decrease the wage rate. An increase in future price decreases extraction labor, but
increases conflict labor. If conflict labor increases more compare to reduction in extraction
labor, then overall demand for labor increases which in turn increases wage rate. A
permanent increase in resource price increases the overall demand for labor, which in turn
increases the wage rate. An increase in agricultural productivity as represented by the
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increase in the price of agricultural goods increases wage rate by increasing the demand for
agricultural labor. An increase in the physical resource stock increases wage rate by
increasing the demand for conflict labor. Other things remaining fixed, an increase in labor
supply reduces the wage rate.
Now we can do the comparative statics again in general equilibrium framework : how
optimal choices for lr, lc, & la change with exogenous shocks. We derive following
proposition from our comparative static analysis.
Proposition 2: When the budget constraint is not binding and there is full
employment in the economy so that wage rate is endogenous, (a) a temporary rise in
resource price increases extraction and decreases conflict, the effect on agricultural sector is
uncertain; (b) an increase in expected future price of resource decreases extraction and
increase conflict, the effect on agricultural sector is uncertain; (c) a permanent rise in
resource price increases extraction, increases conflict if resource stock is sufficiently high,
and decreases agricultural production; (d) a rise in physical resource stock decreases
extraction, increases conflict, and decreases agricultural production; (e) a rise in
agricultural productivity/price decreases extraction, decreases conflict provided that resource
stock is sufficiently high, and increases agricultural production; (f) an increase in labor
supply increases extraction, increases conflict if resource stock is sufficiently high, and
increases agricultural production.
Proof of proposition 2: (see detail derivation in appendix A.2)
(a) Change in p1: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to p1 we
get,
dlr
dp1
=
∂lr
∂p1
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dp1
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
2p1 − p2
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
[p2(2p1 − p2)− p2wy︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−2p2aV ] > 0 (1.29)
dlc
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dp1
=
p2
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
[(2p1 − p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(wy − 2p1 + p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+2p2aV ] < 0 (1.30)
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dla
dp1
=
∂la
∂p1
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dp1
=
2p2aV (p1 − p2)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
(1.31)
Note, dla/dp1 < 0, if and only if p1 − p2 > 0, or dw/dp1 > 0.
A change in resource price affects demand for extraction labor both directly and
indirectly. The indirect effect comes via labor market. As we have shown earlier, a
temporary increase in resource price may increase wage rate, or decrease wage rate, or may
not affect wage rate (depends on relative prices of resources in two periods). An increase in
current resource price increases extraction directly. If wage rate falls, extraction increases
further, then the indirect effect reinforces direct effect leading to more increase of
extraction labor. If wage rate rises, extraction falls, then indirect effect works against
direct effect. But direct effect is dominant here, which results a net increase in extraction
labor. If wage rate does not change, then only partial direct effect works. A temporary
increase in resource price decreases the conflict labor. Again in this case there are two
types of effects. An increase in resource price reduces the conflict, as conflict prize falls
because of increased extraction. The indirect effect on conflict labor comes from change in
the wage rate associated with the change in resource price, which may reinforce or reduce
the overall effect. However, the overall effect of resource price change on conflict labor is
negative. Agricultural labor employment may increase or decrease due to the temporary
increase in resource price, and it depends on how wage rate changes in response to resource
price change. If wage increases due resource price boom, agricultural labor will decrease,
and vice versa.
This proposition implies that when budget constraint is non-binding and there is full
employment in the economy, a current sanction on resource export increases conflict
intensity. Thus, combining propositions 1(a) and 2(a), we can conclude that when budget
constraints of the warring groups are non-binding, a temporary current sanction is always
counter-productive.
(b) Change in p2: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to p2 we
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get,
dlr
dp2
=
∂lr
∂p2
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dp2
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
2p1 − p2
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
[p1 (wy − 2p1 + p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+p2aV ] < 0 (1.32)
dlc
dp2
=
∂lc
∂p2
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dp2
=
p1
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p2 − 2p1)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
(wy + p2 − 2p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−p
2
aV
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy + 2p2 − 2p1)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0 (1.33)
dla
dp2
=
∂la
∂p2
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dp2
=
2p2aV (wy + 3p2 − 4p1)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
(1.34)
Note, dla/dp2 < 0, if and only if (wy + 3p2 − 4p1) > 0, or dw/dp2 > 0 (the sufficient
condition is y > 2r).
An expected increase in future price of resource has opposite effects on extraction
and conflict compared to current price effect, i.e., it decreases the extraction labor and
increases the conflict labor. An increase in future price increases the opportunity cost of
extraction, but raises the benefit of conflict. The change in wage rate associated with the
price change may change the magnitude of the overall effects, but does not reverse them.
The effect of future price of resource on agricultural labor again depends on the change in
wage rate. If wage rate increases because of expected increase in future price of resource,
agricultural labor decreases and vice versa.
The proposition 2(b) suggests that when budget constraint is non-binding and there
is full employment in the economy, an anticipated future sanction on resource exports
decreases conflict intensity. Combining propositions 1(b) and 2(b), we can conclude that
when budget constraints of the warring groups are non-binding, an anticipated future
sanction leads to reduction in conflict intensity.
(c) Change in p (p1 = p2 = p): Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with
respect to p we get,
dlr
dp
=
(
dlr
dp1
+
dlr
dp2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
= − pp
2
aV
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0 (1.35)
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dlc
dp
=
(
dlc
dp1
+
dlc
dp2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
= −p
2
aV (wy − 2p)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
(1.36)
dla
dp
=
(
dla
dp1
+
dla
dp2
)∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=p
=
2p2aV
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − p)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 (1.37)
Note, dlc/dp < 0, if and only if y > 2p/w, or y > 2r.
A permanent increase in resource price increases extraction labor. Increase in current
price increases extraction, but increase in future price reduces extraction. Since the benefit
from future price rise is uncertain due to war, landlords will extract more now. However,
the effect of a permanent increase in resource price on conflict labor is uncertain. An
increase in current price reduces conflict labor, an increase in future price increases conflict
labor. Which effect will dominate depends on the size of the resource stock. A permanent
increase in resource price increases the conflict intensity only if the resource stock is
sufficiently high. A permanent increase in resource price increases the wage rate and thus
decreases the employment and production in agricultural sector. Thus, resource price boom
is harmful for agricultural sector, which supports the famous ‘dutch disease’ hypothesis.
This proposition implies that when budget constraint is non-binding and there is full
employment in the economy, a permanent sanction on resource export reduces war
intensity, if and only if resource stock is sufficiently high.
(d) Change in y: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to y we
get,
dlr
dy
=
∂lr
∂y
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
p2(2p1 − p2)2
2w ∆︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 (1.38)
dlc
dy
=
∂lc
∂y
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
p2
2w ∆︸︷︷︸
−
[−(2p1 − p2)2 − 2p2aV ] > 0 (1.39)
dla
dy
=
∂la
∂y
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
2p2aV p2
w ∆︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 (1.40)
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An increase in physical resource stock increases conflict labor directly, because it increases
conflict prize. Increase in wage rate associated with increase in conflict labor may reduce
some conflict labor. However, net change in conflict labor is positive. An increase in
physical resource stock does not affect the extraction directly (as budget constraint in not
binding), but it reduces extraction labor by increasing wage rate resulted from increase in
conflict labor. A greater resource stock increases wage rate and hence decreases the
employment and production in the agricultural sector. This result also supports the ‘Dutch
disease’ hypothesis that the abundance of natural resources diverts resources away from
formal sector production and causes to negative growth.
This proposition suggests that a curtail of the resource stock by international
community can reduce conflict. However, it should be applied only in extreme situation.
(e) Change in pa: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc,and la with respect to pa we
get,
dlr
dpa
=
∂lr
∂pa
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dpa
=
paV (2p1 − p2)2
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 (1.41)
dlc
dpa
=
∂lc
∂pa
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dpa
= −pap2V [2(2p1 − p2)− wy]
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
(1.42)
dla
dpa
=
∂la
∂pa
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dpa
=
2paV [(2p1 − p2)(3p2 − 2p1)− p2wy]
w2∆
(1.43)
If p1 = p2, then
dla
dpa
=
2papV
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p− wy)
w2 ∆︸︷︷︸
−
> 0
Note, dlc/dpa < 0, if and only if y > 2(2p1 − p2)/w, or ∂lc/∂w < 0.
An increase in agricultural productivity represented by increase of the price of
agricultural goods increases wage rate in the economy. An increase in wage rate reduces
the extraction labor. Conflict labor falls only if increase in wage rate reduces the demand
for conflict labor (depends on the level of resource stock). Finally, an increase in
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agricultural price increases the agricultural labor. A price rise increases the demand for
agricultural labor directly, but it also increases the wage rate which in turn reduces the
demand for labor in agriculture. The direct effect dominates indirect effect, resulting a net
increase of agricultural labor.
This proposition implies that an increase in agricultural productivity that increases
the employment in the sector may reduce the conflict intensity. This result is different from
Janus (2012) paper, which shows that increasing in agricultural productivity increases
conflict.20
(f) Change in L: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to L we
get,
dlr
dL
=
∂lr
∂L
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dL
= −(2p1 − p2)
2
∆
> 0 (1.44)
dlc
dL
=
∂lc
∂L
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dL
=
p2[2(2p1 − p2)− wy]
∆
(1.45)
dla
dL
=
∂la
∂L
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dL
= −4p
2
aV
∆
> 0 (1.46)
Note, dlc/dL > 0, if and only if y > 2(2p1 − p2)/w, or ∂lc/∂w < 0.
An exogenous increase in labor supply reduces wage rate. As a result, employment in
both extraction sector and agricultural sector increases. However, the effects on conflict
labor is uncertain in this case, because of the uncertainty of the effects of wage rate on
conflict labor in our model. A decrease in wage rate increases conflict only if the resource
stock is sufficiently high.
1.3.2 BUDGET CONSTRAINT BINDING
Having discussed the effects of exogenous policy changes in the non-binding budget
constraint case, we will now discuss the same in binding budget constraint case. In
practice, wars are costly and they require lot of resources to finance. Thus, in most cases
20In Janus (2012) model, agriculture sector is related to war sector. But, in our model agriculture sector
is separate from war sector. This might be the reason for different results.
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the budget constraint of the waring groups would be binding. In our model, the budget
constraint is more likely to be binding when (1) the resource stock is higher, (2) the current
resource price is lower, (3) the future resource price is higher, and (4) agricultural
productivity is higher. In this case, the equilibrium conditions of warlords are given by
equations (1.11) and (1.12). Totally differentiate (1.11) and (1.12) we get,
Λdlr = (y − 4l
1
2
r )dp1 + (p1 − wl
1
2
r )dy + (3lr − yl
1
2
r )dw (1.47)
dlc =
[
2l
1
2
r
w
+
(
p1l
− 1
2
r − w
w
)
∂lr
∂p1
]
dp1+
[(
p1l
− 1
2
r − w
w
)
∂lr
∂y
]
dy+
[(
p1l
− 1
2
r − w
w
)
∂lr
∂w
− 2p1l
1
2
r
w2
]
dw,
(1.48)
where Λ = (2p1l
− 1
2
r − 3w + 12wyl
− 1
2
r ) > 0 for the stability of the Nash equilibrium. Again we
consider two scenarios for the economy: unemployment and full employment.
1.3.2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT
When there is unemployment in the economy, wage rate is fixed. Now, we can do
comparative static analysis for the warlords in partial equilibrium framework. We derive
following proposition from comparative statics results.
Proposition 3: When the budget constraint is binding and there is unemployment
in the economy so that wage rate is fixed, (a) a temporary rise in resource price increases
both extraction and conflict; (b) an increase in expected future price of resource does not
affect extraction and conflict; (c) a rise in physical resource stock increases both extraction
and conflict; (d) an exogenous increase in wage rate decreases both the extraction and
conflict,. Proof of proposition 3: (see the detail derivation in appendix A.3)
(a) Change in p1: From (1.47) and (1.48) we can derive the effects of change in p1 on
lr and lc as follows:
∂lr
∂p1
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(y − 4l
1
2
r )
Λ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 (1.49)
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∂lc
∂p1
=
2l
1
2
r
w
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p1l
− 1
2
r − w)
w
.
∂lr
∂p1︸︷︷︸
+
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )
w Λ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 (1.50)
See the proof of (y − 4l
1
2
r ) > 0 in appendix A.3. Note, we get (p1l
− 1
2
r − w) > 0 from first
order condition of lr (equation (8)), and (p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r ) > 0 , as p1l
− 1
2
r > w and y > 2l
1
2
r .
A temporary rise in resource price in the current period leads to hiring more labor
for extraction. This is logical because a rise in resource price increases the marginal benefit
of labor in extraction. As the budget constraint is binding, conflict labor also increases in
this case. With more resource revenue (as both price and extraction increase) warlords can
employ more labor in conflict. However, the increase in extraction also tends to reduce the
conflict labor as prize of conflict falls. The positive effects dominate negative effect,
resulting a net increase in conflict.
The proposition 3(a) suggests that when the budget constraints of the warring
groups are binding and there is unemployment in the economy, a temporary current
sanction reduces war intensity. Note, our finding confirms Janus (2012) finding that under
binding budget constraint current sanction is effective.
(b) Change in p2: From (1.47) and (1.48) we can derive the effects of change in p2 on
lr and lc as follows:
∂lr
∂p2
=
∂lc
∂p2
= 0 (1.51)
Since budget constraint is binding in the current period, the future price does not
affect extraction and conflict in our model. Thus, under binding constraint a sanction
threat that reduce the future price of resource will not be effective in reducing conflict.
(c) Change in y: From (1.47) and (1.48) we can derive the effects of change in y on lr
and lc as follows:
∂lr
∂y
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
p1 − wl
1
2
r
Λ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 (1.52)
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∂lc
∂y
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p1l
− 1
2
r − w)
w
.
∂lr
∂y︸︷︷︸
+
=
l
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )2
w Λ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 (1.53)
When the budget constraint is binding, an increase in physical resource stock
increases extraction. Conflict also increases as prize of conflict increases. Thus, similar to
non-binding case, when budget constraint is binding and there is unemployment in the
economy, a reduction of resource stock can reduce the conflict.
(d) Change in w: From (1.47) and (1.48) we can derive the effects of change in w on
lr and lc as follows:
∂lr
∂w
=
3lr − yl
1
2
r
Λ
= −p1
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(y − 4l
1
2
r )
w Λ︸︷︷︸
+
< 0 (1.54)
∂lc
∂w
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p1l
− 1
2
r − w)
w
.
∂lr
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
−2p1l
1
2
r
w2
=
4p1l
1
2
r
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(w − p1l−
1
2
r ) +p1w
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(l
1
2
r − y)
w2 Λ︸︷︷︸
+
< 0 (1.55)
An increase in wage rate, which increases the marginal cost of extraction labor,
decreases the labor in extraction. An increase in wage rate decreases conflict labor for two
reasons: firstly, an increase in wage rate increases marginal cost of labor; and secondly, a
decrease in extraction reduces the resource revenue so that warlord can afford less labor.
However, a reduction in extraction associated with wage increase tend to increase the
conflict labor. Negative effects dominate positive effect resulting a net decrease in conflict.
Thus, under binding budgets an exogenous increase in wage rate can reduce conflict
intensity.
1.3.2.2 FULL EMPLOYMENT
When there is full employment in the economy, wage rate is endogenous. Any exogenous
policy changes will affect wage rate through labor market. In this case, the labor market
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equilibrium condition is as follows:
2lr(p1, w, y) + 2lc(p1, w, y) + la(pa, w, V ) = L (1.56)
Totally differentiate equation (1.56) we get:[
∂lr
∂w
+
∂lc
∂w
+
1
2
∂la
∂w
]
dw = −
[
∂lr
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂p1
]
dp1−
[
∂lr
∂y
+
∂lc
∂y
]
dy− 1
2
∂la
∂V
dV − 1
2
∂la
∂pa
dpa+
1
2
dL,
(1.57)
where
∂lr
∂w
+
∂lc
∂w
+
1
2
∂la
∂w
=
p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ
w2Λ
=
Ω
w2Λ
Note, for stability of equilibrium of the labor market the coefficient of dw must be negative.
Thus, Ω/w2Λ < 0⇒ Ω = p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ < 0.
From (1.57) we derive the changes in w with respect to changes in p1, pa, y, and L as
follows: (see appendix A.4 for derivation)
dw
dp1
=
w2
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(4l
1
2
r − y) +w
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)
Ω︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dpa
= − paΛ
Ω︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dy
= −w
2
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p1 − wl
1
2
r ) +wl
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )2
Ω︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
dw
dL
=
w2Λ
2 Ω︸︷︷︸
−
< 0.
(1.58)
In this case, a temporary rise in resource price increases the demand for both
extraction and conflict labors, which cause a rise in wage rate. An increase in agricultural
productivity increases the wage rate by increasing the demand for agricultural labor. An
increase in physical resource stock increases wage rate by increasing the demand for both
extraction and conflict labors. Other things remaining fixed, an exogenous increase in labor
supply reduces wage rate.
Now we can do the comparative statics again in general equilibrium framework. We
derive following proposition from comparative statics.
Proposition 4: When the budget constraint is binding and there is full employment
in the economy so that wage rate is endogenous, (a) a temporary rise in resource price
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increases both extraction and conflict only if agricultural sector is sufficiently large, and
decreases agricultural production; (b) a rise in physical resource stock increases extraction,
increases conflict only if agricultural sector is sufficiently large, and decreases agricultural
production; (c) a rise in agricultural productivity or price decreases both extraction and
conflict, and increase agricultural production; (d) an increase in labor supply increases both
extraction and conflict, and also increase agricultural production.
Proof of proposition 4: (see detail derivation in appendix A.4)
(a) Change in p1: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to p1 we
get,
dlr
dp1
=
∂lr
∂p1
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dp1
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w
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(y − 4l
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2
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Λ
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2
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(1.59)
dlc
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∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂w
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dw
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(1.60)
dla
dp1
=
∂la
∂p1
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dp1
=
(
−2p
2
aV
w3
)
.
dw
dp1︸︷︷︸
+
< 0
(1.61)
Note, dlr/dp1 > 0 and dlc/dp1 > 0, if V is sufficiently large.
We know that a temporary increase in resource price increases demand for both
extraction labor and conflict labor, if other things remain constant. However, an increase
in resource price also increases wage rate, which tend to reduce the demand for extraction
labor and conflict labor. Which effect will dominate depends on the size of the agricultural
sector. If agricultural sector is relatively small (i.e. V is small) so that employment in
agricultural sector is low, then a rise in resource price does cause a big increase in wage
rate (as less labor available who can shift from agriculture sector to extraction and conflict
sectors). A big rise in wage leads to a big fall in the demand for extraction and conflict
labor. Thus, net effect on the demand for extraction labor and conflict labor might be
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negative if wage rate rises enough. On the other hand, if agricultural sector is relatively
large, change in wage rate will be small, then an increase in resource price may lead to
increase in both extraction and conflict labor. In this case, employment in agricultural
sector surely falls due to increase in wage rate.
The proposition 4(a) implies that even if the budget constraint is binding, a current
sanction may not reduce the conflict intensity if the wage rate is endogenous (i.e., full
employment in the economy). The effects of sanction depends on the alternative
employment opportunities, which in turn depends on the size the formal sector (agriculture
sector in our model). If the formal sector is small so that employment opportunity is low, a
sanction that reduces resource price can increase the conflict. A reduction in resource price
due to sanction reduces the demand for both extraction and conflict labors initially, as a
result wage rate falls. If alternative employment opportunity is low, the fall in wage will be
high. If the fall in wage rate is sufficiently high, the warlords will hire more labor for
conflict that may exceed the initial reduction in demand for conflict labor. Thus, sanction
on resource exports may be counter-productive under binding budget constraint as well.
This finding contradicts Janus (2012) finding that under binding budget constraint a
current sanction reduces war intensity.
(b) Change in y: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to y we
get,
dlr
dy
=
∂lr
∂y
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
p1 − wl
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2
r
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dla
dy
=
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+
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dw
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)
.
dw
dy︸︷︷︸
+
< 0
(1.64)
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Note, dlc/dy > 0, if V is sufficiently large.
A rise in physical resource stock increases extraction directly, but decreases through
rise in wage rate associated with it. In this case, direct effect dominates indirect effect
resulting a net increase in extraction. A rise in physical resource stock tends to increase the
demand for conflict labor directly, while it tends to reduce the demand for conflict labor
via increase in wage rate (as demand for both extraction and conflict labor rise). The
magnitude of wage increase depends on the relative size of the agricultural sector. The
larger the agricultural sector, the more the labor employed in that sector. Then labors can
be easily transferred from agriculture to war sector and the increment of wage will be low.
In this case, direct effect dominates indirect effect and there will be net increase in conflict
labor. However, if agricultural sector is relatively small, employment level in this sector
will be low. In this case, wage increase will be high due to increased demand from war
sector. If increase in wage is sufficiently high, the indirect effect may outweigh the direct
effect, which results a net decrease in conflict labor. An increase in resource stock decreases
the employment in agricultural sector by increasing wage rate.
The proposition 4(b) implies that if the budget constraint is binding, but wage rate
is endogenous, a reduction in physical resource stock may not decrease the war intensity. If
formal sector is relatively small so that employment opportunity is low, a reduction in
resource stock (by international action) may exacerbate conflict.
(c) Change in pa: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to pa we
get,
dlr
dpa
=
∂lr
∂pa
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dpa
=
∂lr
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
.
dw
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+
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(1.65)
dlc
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∂lc
∂pa
+
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.
dw
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=
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∂w︸︷︷︸
−
.
dw
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+
< 0
(1.66)
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An increase in agricultural productivity or price increases the demand for
agricultural labor directly. As a result wage rate increases. A rise in wage rate reduces both
the extraction and conflict. Increase in wage rate reduces the demand for agricultural labor
also, but direct effect dominates indirect effect, resulting net increase in agricultural labor.
This proposition suggests that if the budget constraint is binding, an increase in
agricultural productivity definitely reduces the conflict intensity. This implies that if
alternative opportunities of employment and income increase in the economy, less people
will engage in war activities.
(d) Change in L: Differentiating optimal values of lr, lc, and la with respect to L we
get,
dlr
dL
=
∂lr
∂L
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dL
=
∂lr
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−
.
dw
dL︸︷︷︸
−
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(1.68)
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+
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.
dw
dL
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−
.
dw
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−
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dla
dL
=
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+
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∂w
.
dw
dL
=
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∂w︸︷︷︸
−
.
dw
dL︸︷︷︸
−
> 0
(1.70)
An exogenous increase in labor supply reduces wage rate and thus increases
employment in all sectors. This result explains why countries with more population and
low level of income are more likely to experience civil wars.
1.4 PIECEMEAL REDUCTION IN WAR EFFORTS
Now we will examine, starting from war equilibrium, if both warlords agree to reduce the
war efforts mutually, whether their expected return increase or decrease. An increase in
expected return implies an increase in welfare and vice versa. Again we will consider two
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cases: budget constraint binding, and budget constraint non-binding. However, now we
will not assume that two groups are symmetric.21
1.4.1 BUDGET CONSTRAINT NON-BINDING
When budget constraint is non-binding, with optimal values of lri and lci, i = 1, 2, the
maximum expected return of group 1 is:
R1 = p1(2l
1
2
r1)− (wlr1 + wlc1) +
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2), (1.71)
and that of group 2 is:
R2 = p1(2l
1
2
r2)− (wlr2 + wlc2) +
lc2
lc1 + lc2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2) (1.72)
Given these optimum R1 and R2, we examine the outcome when warlords negotiate with
each other and agree to reduce war efforts mutually. We derive the following proposition in
this case.
Proposition 5: When the budget constraint is not binding, a bilateral piecemeal
reduction in war efforts unambiguously increase the welfare of each warring party both in
the presence and absence of unemployment.
Proof of proposition 5: (see appendix A.5 for detail proof)
Unemployment in the economy: We know that when there is unemployment in the
economy, wage rate is fixed. Then totally differentiate equation (1.71), and using the first
order conditions of group 1 and assuming dlc1 = dlc2, we get:
dR1 = − lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2 = −wdlc2 (1.73)
Similarly, totally differentiate (1.72), and using the first order conditions of group 2 and
assuming dlc1 = dlc2, we get:
dR2 = − lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc1 = −wdlc1 (1.74)
Equations (1.73) and (1.74) imply that if the budget constraint is non-binding and wage
rate is fixed, a bilateral reduction of war efforts (i.e., dlci < 0) increases the expected return
21Even if two groups are non-symmetric, at Nash equilibrium, lr1 = lr2 and lc1 = lc2 in this case.
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of both warring groups. In this case, the gain of each group comes from decrease in wining
probability of the other group due to the reduction of conflict labor by that group. The
increase in expected return of group 1 is equal to the change in wining probability of group
2 times the conflict prize times the change in conflict labor of group 2 (i.e.,
lc1/(lc1 + lc2)
2[p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)]dlc2 = wdlc2).
Full employment in the economy : When there is full employment in the economy,
wage rate is endogenous. Totally differentiate (1.71), using the first order conditions, and
assuming dlc1 = dlc2 and p1 = p2, we get:
dR1 = − lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlr2 − wdlc2 − (lr1 + lc1)dw = (lr1 − lc1)dw − wdlc2 (1.75)
Similarly, totally differentiate (1.72), using the first order conditions, and assuming
dlc1 = dlc2 and p1 = p2, we get:
dR2 = − lc2
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r1 dlr1 − wdlc1 − (lr2 + lc2)dw = (lr2 − lc2)dw − wdlc1 (1.76)
From labor market equilibrium condition we get:
dw =
(
w
2lri + la
)
dlci, i = 1, 2
Substituting the expression of dw in to (1.75) and (1.76) we get:
dR1 = −(βw)dlc2, dR2 = −(βw)dlc1, (1.77)
where
β =
(
lr1 + lc1 + la
2lr1 + la
)
=
(
lr2 + lc2 + la
2lr2 + la
)
> 0
Equation (1.77) implies that dRi > 0, if dlcj < 0.
When wage rate is endogenous, a bilateral reduction in war efforts changes the
expected revenue of each warlord in different ways. Firstly, a reduction in conflict labor by
other warlord (j) decreases the probability of wining of that group, and thus increases the
expected revenue of group i (by wdlcj). Secondly, decrease in wage rate due to decrease in
conflict labors decreases the costs of extraction and conflict (by(lri + lci)dw) and thus
increases return further. However, increases in extraction (due to decreases in wage) by the
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other group decreases return somewhat (by 2lrjdw). But overall increases in return is
greater than decreases in return, resulting a net increase in return.
Proposition (5) implies that a bilateral piecemeal reduction of war efforts
unambiguously increases the welfare of both warring parties, when budget constraints of
the parties are non-binding. This peace dividend comes from the fact that if both warlords
could negotiate with each other and could reach a bargaining solution to share and use
resources peacefully, their expected return would have been higher compared to
Nash-equilibrium solution under conflict. War leads to inefficient use of conflict labor.
Thus, a reduction in conflict labor increases the efficiency and improves the welfare. This
finding suggests that the most effective policy for conflict resolution would be diplomatic
negotiation.
One approach of rebellion is rebellion-as-mistake (Collier et al., 2004). Each group
overestimates the prospects of victory and thus puts more war efforts. If international
community negotiates with the rival groups and can convince them that both groups will
be benefited by reducing their war efforts, then they may agree to reduce war efforts.
Diplomatic negotiation reduces the information gap and commitment problems between
two groups and thus increases the chance of peace. Regan and Aydin (2006) empirically
show that diplomatic intervention is successful in reducing the expected duration of war.
1.4.2 BUDGET CONSTRAINT BINDING
When the budget constraint is binding, with optimal values of lri and lci, i = 1, 2, the
maximum expected return of group 1 is:
R1 =
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2), (1.78)
and that of group 2 is:
R2 =
lc2
lc1 + lc2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2) (1.79)
Now we will examine if warlords negotiate with each other and agrees to reduce war
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efforts mutually, what happens to their welfare. We derive the following proposition in this
case.
Proposition 6: When the budget constraint is binding, a bilateral piecemeal
reduction in war efforts unambiguously increase the welfare of each warring party both in
the presence and absence of unemployment
Proof of proposition 6: (see detail proof in appendix A.6)
Unemployment in the economy : When there is unemployment in the economy, wage
rate is fixed. Then, totally differentiate (1.78) and using the first order conditions, we get:
dR1 = −2(1 + γ2)wdlc2 (1.80)
Similarly, totally differentiate (1.79) and using the first order conditions, we get:
dR2 = −2(1 + γ1)wdlc1 (1.81)
Equations (1.80) and (1.81) imply that if the budget constraint is non-binding and wage
rate is fixed, a bilateral reduction of war efforts (i.e., dlci < 0) increases the expected return
of both warring groups. In this case, gain in return of each warring group comes from two
sources. Firstly, reduction in war efforts of group j decreases it’s winning probability, and
thus increases the return of group i (which is equal to (1 + γj)w.dlcj). Secondly, extraction
of group j also decreases due to decrease in war as budget constraint is binding, which
increases the return of group i further (by (1 + γj)(p1l
− 1
2
r2 − w)dlr2 = (1 + γj)w.dlcj).
Full employment in the economy : When there is full employment in the economy,
wage rate is endogenous. Then, totally differentiate (1.78) and using first order conditions,
we get:
dR1 = −2(1 + γ1)(lr1 + lc1)dw − 2(1 + γ2)wdlc2 (1.82)
Similarly, totally differentiate (1.79) and using first order conditions, we get:
dR2 = −2(1 + γ2)(lr2 + lc2)dw − 2(1 + γ1)wdlc1 (1.83)
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From labor market equilibrium condition we get,
Γdw = −wp1l−
1
2
r1 (dlc1 + dlc2), (1.84)
where Γ = 2[w(lr1 + lc1)− la(p1l−
1
2
r1 − w)] < 0, for the stability of excess demand function
for labor. Equation (1.84) implies that wage rate decreases when warlords decrease their
war efforts (i.e., dlc1 < 0, dlc2 < 0). In this case, equations (1.82) and (1.83) imply that a
bilateral reduction of war efforts definitely increase the returns of both warring groups.
When wage rate is endogenous, a bilateral reduction in war efforts increases return of
each group by two channels. First, reduction in number of soldiers and associated
reduction of extraction by group j increases the return of group i (by 2(1 + γj)wdlcj).
Second, reduction of conflict labor and extraction labor reduces the wage rate and thus
reduces the cost of both extraction and conflict.
Thus, proposition (6) implies that a bilateral piecemeal reduction of war efforts
unambiguously increase the welfare of the warring groups, when their budget constraints
are binding. It again suggests that diplomatic negotiation can be an effective tool for
conflict resolution in the presence of information gap and commitment problem.
1.5 CONCLUSION
Most of the empirical literature on civil conflicts find that the countries that are dependent
on natural resources, have large extent of poverty, have more ethnic fictionalization, have
large population, have high proportion of mountainous terrain or jungles, lack institutions
for conflict resolution tend to experience more civil conflict (e.g., Fearon and Lation, 2003;
Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). There are no short
run solutions to these structural causes of civil war. However, international community can
target the immediate causes of conflict by reducing the reward of conflict or by raising the
return of peaceful activities. Our paper provides some insights about the potential policies
for conflict resolution.
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In this chapter, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model of non-ethnic
civil conflict, where two warlords fight with each other to capture resources. In our model
resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous during the conflict, which is true for
many real conflicts. By including a separate agricultural sector we create a general
equilibrium framework to analyze the effects of exogenous policy shocks on civil conflict.
The findings of the chapter have important policy implications for conflict resolution.
First, one of the most popular policies for conflict resolution is to impose sanctions on
exports of natural resources from conflict zone, known as ‘blood diamond’ policy. Our
results suggest that when the budget constraint is not binding, the policy of blood
diamond is always counter-productive (i.e., a fall in resource price leads to increase of
conflict). However, in this case, a credible sanction threat that decreases the future prize of
conflict will reduce the conflict. Our results also suggest that a current sanction will surely
limit the conflict, if the budget constraints of warring groups are binding and wage rate is
fixed. Note, Janus (2012) also finds the same result for the binding constraint case.
However, we find that if wage rate is endogenous and there are limited opportunities of
employment in alternative sector, such as in agricultural sector, the conflict intensity may
increase even if the budget constraint is binding. Thus, unlike Janus (2012), we show that
sanctions might be counter-productive when the budget constraints of the warring groups
are binding. Second, our results suggest that the most effective policy for conflict
resolution would be bilateral piecemeal reduction in war efforts. Regardless of whether
budget constraint binds or not, a mutual reduction in war efforts by the warring groups
increase their welfare. Thus, if international community can negotiate with the warring
groups and can convince them that both will be benefited by reducing the conflict, then
they may agree to reduce conflict efforts. A third option is the productivity improvement
in the agricultural sector (or any other sector like manufacturing sector). An increase in
productivity will increase the labor demand in agricultural sector, which in turn can
increase wage rate and can limit the conflict. Another policy would be to destroy the
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physical resource stocks for which the groups are fighting. But, it is very difficult for
international community to apply this policy, and it may decrease post-conflict welfare.
However, in extreme situation international community may apply this policy.
Note, our findings may not be applicable to all types of civil conflicts. They are
applied to particular types of conflict, specifically non-ethnic conflicts where resources
extraction is endogenous. In fact, there is no panacea for all types of conflicts. The
effectiveness of policy depends on the nature and type of conflict.
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CHAPTER 2
NATURAL RESOURCES AND INTER-STATE CONFLICTS: EFFECTS OF
TRADE SANCTIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Most of the recent theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between natural
resource and conflict focus mainly on civil wars. However, war between independent
nations over natural resources are not uncommon. Bakeless (1921) studies the causes of
several wars between the years 1878 to 1918 and finds that 14 of the 20 major wars had
significant economic motivations, often related to conflicts over resources. In recent history,
the most cited examples of the role of natural resources in inter-state wars are the Iran-Iraq
war, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Falklands war. Many other historical examples of
militarized inter-state dispute seem to be about natural resources. Examples include
Algerian war of independence (with France, oil), Algeria and Morocco (Western Sahara,
phosphate and possibly oil), Argentina and Chile (Beagle Channel, fisheries and oil),
Argentina and Uruguay (Rio de la Plata, minerals), Bolivia and Paraguay (Chaco War,
oil), Bolivia, Chile, and Peru (War of the Pacific, minerals and sea access), China and
Vietnam (Paracel Islands, oil), Ecuador and Peru (Cordillera del Condor, oil and other
minerals), Nigeria and Cameroon (Bakassi peninsula, oil), and many others.1
Klare (2001) argues that, following the end of the Cold War, control of valuable
natural resources has become increasingly important, and these resources will become a
primary motivation for wars in the future. Like blood diamonds that are believed to fuel
African civil wars, many people think blood oil to be a major determinant of international
aggression (Kaldor et al., 2007). Some recent and ongoing tensions involving territorial
claims are thought to be mineral resource related. Examples of such tensions include
Bangladesh-Myanmar, Bangladesh-India, Guyana-Suriname, Nicaragua-Honduras,
1See Acemoglu et al., 2012; Caselli et al., 2013; Carter Center, 2010; De Soysa et al., 2011.
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Guinea-Gabon, Chad-Libya, Oman-Saudi Arabia, Algeria-Tunisia, Eritrea-Yemen,
Guyana-Venezuela, Congo-Gabon, Equatorial Guinea-Gabon, Greece-Turkey,
Colombia-Venezuela, Southern and Northern Sudan (Caselli et al., 2013; Carter Center,
2010).2
Though there are some case studies about the role of natural resources in inter-state
wars, there are very limited theoretical and empirical studies about underlying mechanism
of these wars. The literature on inter-state conflicts so far has emphasized the role of trade
(e.g., Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001; Syropoulos, 2006; Becsi and Lahiri, 2007; Martin et
al., 2008; Rohner et al., 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2015), domestic institutions (e.g., Maoz and
Russett, 1993; Conconi et al., 2012), development (e.g., Gartzke, 2007; Gartzke and
Rohner, 2011), and stocks of weapons (e.g., Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel, 2010).
Surprisingly, natural resources have received little systematic attention in terms of both
modeling and empirical investigations.
Many researchers study conflict between two countries in trade-theoretic framework
and show how globalization and trade affects conflict efforts. For example, Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (2001) develop a simple model with two small countries disputing over a
resource used in the production of tradeables. They show that if the international price of
the contested resource is lower than a country’s autarkic price, the opportunity cost of
arming rises, and thus, the introduction of trade softens the intensity of competition for the
contested resource, reduces arming, and raises welfare relative to autarky. The opposite can
occur, however, when the international price of the contested resource is higher than its
autarkic price. Syropoulos (2006) also examines the relationship between trade openness
and inter-state conflict for contested resources in a general equilibrium framework. He
shows that depending on world prices and their effect on domestic factor prices, it is
possible for trade to reduce the opportunity cost of arming and thereby intensify conflict.
Becsi and Lahiri (2007) use a three country framework to examine how third country can
2Recently a U.N. Tribunal has settled the dispute over maritime boundary between Bangladesh-Myanmar,
and Bangladesh-India in the Bay of Bengal.
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use policies to influence the conflict between two other countries. Garfinkel et al. (2015)
combine a standard trade model with a contest function to study interstate disputes over
resources. They show that conflict over resources affects the pattern of comparative
advantage, and free trade may intensify conflicts so much that autarky may be preferable
to free trade. Acemoglu et al. (2012) study the war between a resource rich and a resource
poor countries in a dynamic framework to see under what conditions such war can be
prevented. They find that in the case of inelastic resource demand, war incentives increase
over time and war may become inevitable; and under monopolistic situations, regulation of
prices and quantities by the resource-rich country can prevent war. De Soysa et al. (2011)
develop a set of models to study a strategic perspective on petroleum and interstate
conflict. In contrast to the popular belief that oil is a catalyst for war, they argue that oil
exporters actually experience less wars as powerful petroleum importers protect
petrostates. Caselli et al. (2013) study how the geographic location of natural resource
endowments affects the likelihood of inter-state wars. They find the the likelihood of war
increases if the resources of the warring countries are closer to the border.
Unlike the case of cross-country conflicts, there is sizable theoretical and empirical
literature on the role of natural resources in civil conflicts.3 The main theme of this
literature is that natural resource abundance is often the principal cause of civil wars. Our
paper is complementary to the existing literature in the sense that we emphasis the role of
natural resource in the inter-state war as well. Most of the theoretical work on conflicts
assumes the fighting motives as given; the objective is to study the determinants of fighting
efforts (Caselli et al., 2013). In our paper, we also do not focus on the causes of conflict,
rather we examine the factors that determine the relative war efforts of the two warring
countries. At the same time we examine how international sanctions on resource exports
affect the intensity of war.
Most of the existing literature use a static one-period framework to study the
3Summarized by Ross (2004), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007), Blattman & Miguel (2010), Van der Ploeg
(2011).
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relationship between natural resource and inter-state conflict.4 Besides, resource stocks are
considered exogenous during conflict in the existing literature on inter-state conflict, i.e., it
does not consider the possibility that natural resources can be extracted and sold during
the conflict. Janus (2012) however develops a two-period model for civil conflict between
two social groups and considers the possibility that resource extraction is endogenous.
Following Janus (2012), we develop a two-period model for inter-state conflict, where
resource extraction is endogenous. However, unlike Janus (2012) who employs a partial
equilibrium framework, we treat wage rates as endogenous. In other words, we employ a
general equilibrium model where two neighboring countries fight to acquire each other’s
natural resource stock. In our model in each country labor force is used for three purposes:
agricultural production, resource extraction, and war. The two competitive labor markets
in the two countries determine equilibrium wage rates in them, which in turn determine
their relative war efforts.5
Under our framework, first of all, we examine the determinants of relative war efforts
in the two asymmetric countries. We find that regardless of the differences in initial
ownership of resource stocks, the war efforts of the two countries will be the same, ceteris
paribus; a country with larger labor force exerts more war efforts; and a country with larger
land endowment or higher productivity exerts lower war efforts (i.e., paradox of power).
Second, we examine the effects of different types of international sanctions on war efforts of
the two countries. We find that a temporary current sanction on both countries, or even on
one of the countries, will be counter-productive (i.e., increases the war intensity); an
anticipated future sanction on both countries will reduce war intensity; whether an
anticipated future sanction on one country will reduce war intensity depends on the level of
resource stock; and finally, the effect of a permanent sanction on both countries is in
general ambiguous, but war intensity will fall only if the resource stocks of the countries
4The only exception is Acemoglu et al. (2012), who consider a dynamic framework.
5This framework is also applicable in an intra-state conflict, where labor market is segmented between
two regions of a country and two regions fight with each other.
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are sufficiently high.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we describe the basic
setup of the model. Section 2.3 analyses the equilibrium conditions and compare the
equilibrium war efforts of the two countries. In section 2.4, we discuss the effects of
international sanctions on war efforts. In section 2.5, we introduce uncertainty about future
sanction. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 THE MODEL
Consider two neighboring countries which are endowed with some initial stock of natural
resources. The government of each country is motivated by greed, and fight with each
other to capture more resources. There are three sectors in each economy: government
sector, resource extraction sector, and agricultural sector.6 Each country is also endowed
with fixed amount of labor force and land. The government of each country recruits labor
as soldiers. The extraction sector hires labor to extract natural resources. The agricultural
sector uses land and also hires labor to produce agricultural goods. Thus, the aggregate
demand for labor is the sum of the labor demands from all three sectors. The model works
in two stages: in the first stage the governments decide how many soldier to have; in the
second stage extraction sector and agricultural sector decide how much labor to employ.
Labors move freely between sectors but not between countries, implying that the wage rate
is same in all sectors within a country. We consider two periods: in the first period each
country extracts some of the resources it possesses and fight with each other; if a country
wins the war, in the second period it gets all the remaining resource stock. Each
government finances war costs by imposing lump sum tax on both the extraction and
agricultural sectors.7
Let, country i (i=1,2) possesses an initial resource stock, yi, and hires lci amount of
6The third sector could be any other sector not involved directly in the war.
7This is done to simplify the analysis. One could in principle assume that revenue for resources finance
war efforts as in Lahiri (2010) and Janus (2012).
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labor for fighting. Then, the country i’s winning probability in war is given by the
conventional ratio-form contest success function: qi = lci/(lci + lcj), i=1,2, and j 6= i. This
function implies that for given amount of soldiers of country j, the winning probability of
country i increases with it’s number of soldiers and vice versa. The extraction sector hires
lri amount of labor for extraction and the resource extraction function is given by
ri = 2l
1
2
ri, (i = 1, 2). There is also a private agricultural sector in each country, and it hires
lai amount of labor from the labor market. The agricultural production function is given
by: Ai = 2λil
1
2
aiV
1
2
i (i = 1, 2), where Vi is the fixed amount of land the economy has and λi is
the productivity parameter of the agricultural sector.
We consider that each country is a small open economy and exporter of natural
resources in the world market. Thus, world market price is given for the country. Let p1 be
the world price of natural resource in period 1, and p2 is the world price of natural resource
in period 2. We shall assume the prices to be the same and denote the common price by p,
i.e., p1 = p2 = p. However, later we shall consider changes in p1 but not in p2, and vice
versa. Therefore, we shall keep the separate notations for that purpose.
The expected return of the extraction sector of country i is:
Rri = p1ri − wilri + qip2(yi + yj − ri − rj)
= p1(2l
1
2
ri)− wilri +
lci
lci + lcj
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj), i = 1, 2, and j 6= i,
(2.1)
where wi is the domestic market wage rate in country i, and p1ri − wilri is the net revenue
in period 1. (yi + yj − ri − rj) is the resource stock that country i get at the beginning of
the 2nd period, if it wins the war. For simplicity, we also assume no discounting for period
2. Since qi is the winning probability of country i in the conflict, the expected value of
resource stock in the 2nd period is qip2(yi + yj − ri − rj).8
The country is an importer of agricultural goods. Let, pa is the international market
price of agricultural goods. Then, the profit of agricultural sector is given by:
Rai = pa(2λil
1
2
aiV
1
2
i )− wilai, i = 1, 2. (2.2)
8We do not consider second period extraction of resources, because it does not affect our analysis.
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The government of each country imposes lump sum tax Ti on both extraction and
agricultural sectors to finance its war cost. Then, the budget balance equation of the
government is given by:
wilci = Ti, i = 1, 2, (2.3)
and total income of all agents in the country i is given by:9
I i = wiLi +Rri +Rai − Ti, i = 1, 2, (2.4)
where Li is the fixed supply of labor in country i .
The labor market equilibrium condition in country i is given by:
lri + lai + lci = Li, i = 1, 2. (2.5)
Equations (2.1) to (2.5) describe the basic structure of the model. In the next
section we derive equilibrium conditions of the two countries.
2.3 THE EQUILIBRIUM
We assume that the sequence of decision making is as follows:
Stage 1: The labor market clears,
Stage 2: Two governments simultaneously decide on war efforts to maximize national
incomes of the countries,
Stage 3: For given war efforts and winning probability of the government, extraction
sector of each country decides how much resource to extract in period 1 and how much to
leave for period 2. At the same time, the agricultural sector also decides how much to
produce in period 1.
We solve the game by backward induction method. In stage 3, we derive the optimal
level of extraction for extraction sector, given the war efforts and winning probability of
the government. At the same time, we derive the optimal level of employment in the
9We abstract from the possibility that conflict adversely affects the lives, infrastructures, and thus lower
the productive capacity of a country.
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agricultural sector. Then in stage 2, we derive optimal level of war efforts for the two
governments who play a simultaneous move game to maximize national incomes.
From equation (2.1) we derive optimal extraction labor for country i. The first order
condition for optimal lri is:
p1l
− 1
2
ri = wi + qip2l
− 1
2
ri , i = 1, 2, (2.6)
which states that marginal benefit of extraction labor (the left-hand side) must equal
marginal cost of extraction labor (the right-hand side). Marginal benefit of extraction
equals the value of marginal product of extraction labor in the first period, while marginal
cost equals wage cost of labor plus opportunity cost of extracting now instead of conserve
it for the future. The opportunity cost of extraction is equal to the probability of winning
the conflict (qi) times the value of marginal product of labor in period 2 (p2l
− 1
2
ri ). From
equation (2.6) we get optimal lri as follows:
lri =
(
p1 − qip2
wi
)2
, i = 1, 2.
From equation (2.2) we derive optimal agricultural labor for country i. The first
order condition for optimal lai is:
paλil
− 1
2
a V
1
2
i = wi, i = 1, 2. (2.7)
Equation (2.7) equates marginal benefit of agricultural labor to the marginal cost, where
marginal benefit is the value of marginal product of agricultural labor and marginal cost is
just wage cost of labor. From (2.7) we get the optimal lai as follows:
lai =
p2aλ
2
iVi
w2i
, i = 1, 2.
Substituting the optimal solution of lri into equation (2.1), we get optimal expected
return for the extraction sector as follows:
Rri = wilri + qip2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
rj), i = 1, 2, and j 6= i. (2.8)
Substituting the optimal solution of lai into equation (2.2), we get optimal return for
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the agricultural sector as follows:
Rai = wilai, i = 1, 2. (2.9)
Substituting (2.8) and (2.9) into equation (2.4), we get total income of the country i
as:
I i = wiLi + wilri + qip2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
rj) + wilai − wilci + Fi
= wiLi + wi
(
p1 − qip2
wi
)2
+
lci
lci + lcj
p2
(
yi + yj − 2p1 − qjp2
wj
)
+wi
(
p2aλ
2
iVi
w2i
)
− wilci + Fi, (i = 1, 2, and j 6= i). (2.10)
At the second stage, each government maximize I i to choose lci. From (2.10) we get
first-order condition for lci as (see appendix B.1):
∂qi
∂lci
p2(yi + yj − ri − rj)− qip2 ∂rj
∂lci
= wi,
which gives
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj)−
2p22
wj
.
lcilcj
(lci + lcj)3
= wi, (i = 1, 2, and j 6= i). (2.11)
The left hand side of equation (2.11) is the marginal benefit of conflict labor. The
first term of left hand side is the change in the likelihood of winning the conflict (∂qi/∂lci)
times the value of resource stock after initial extraction of two countries
(p2(yi + yj − ri − rj)). Note, country j changes the level of extraction in response to change
in the conflict efforts of country i. As a result marginal benefit of country i changes by
qip2(∂rj/∂lci), which is the second term of the left hand side. The right hand side of (2.11)
is marginal cost of war, which is simply the wage cost of additional soldier.
Equation (2.11) gives us the reaction functions for the two countries. Using these, we
derive the following relationship between lc1 and lc2 (see appendix B.2):
w1lc1 = w2lc2 ⇔ lc2 = w1
w2
lc1 (2.12)
Equation (2.12) implies that relative war efforts of the two countries depends on the
relative wage rate, and in equilibrium two countries war costs are same even though the
48
two countries can be asymmetric in many ways.
Using (2.12) we can derive optimal lr1 and lr2 in terms of wage rates and exogenous
parameters as follows:
lr1 =
[
p1
w1
− p2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
]2
, lr2 =
[
p1
w2
− p2w1
w2(w1 + w2)
]2
Substituting (2.12) in to (2.11) we get optimal values of lc1 and lc2 as follows:
lc1 =
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B, lc2 =
w1
(w1 + w2)2
B,
where
B = p2
(
y1 + y2 − 2p1
w1
+
2p2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
− 2p1
w2
+
2p2w1
w2(w1 + w2)
− 2p2
w1 + w2
)
.
Substituting the optimal lc1, lr1, and la1 in to equation (2.5) we get labor market
equilibrium condition of country 1 as follows:
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B +
[
p1
w1
− p2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
]2
+
p2aλ
2
1V1
w21
= L1 (2.13)
Substituting the optimal lc2, lr2, and la2 in to equation (2.5) we get labor market
equilibrium condition of country 2 as follows:
w1
(w1 + w2)2
B +
[
p1
w2
− p2w1
w2(w1 + w2)
]2
+
p2aλ
2
2V2
w22
= L2 (2.14)
Equations (2.13) and (2.14) simultaneously determine optimal w1 and w2. Though we
don’t have explicit solutions for w1 and w2, we can determine the relative magnitude of the
two. The relative magnitudes of w1 and w2 will depend on the relative values of different
parameters of the two countries. Relative wage rate determines the relative war efforts of
the two countries. Now we will examine the relative war efforts of the two countries if they
are non-symmetric in terms of different parameters. With p1 = p2 = p, the optimal lri and
lci are as follows:
lr1 = lr2 =
(
p
w1 + w2
)2
, lc1 =
w2
w1
lc2 =
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B
where B = p(y1 + y2 − 6p/(w1 + w2)) > 0.
Using these results and Combining equations (2.13) and (2.14) we can derive the
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following equation (see appendix B.3):
(L1 − L2) + B
(w1 + w2)2
(w1 − w2) +
(
a2
w22
− a1
w21
)
= 0, (2.15)
where a1 = p
2
aλ
2
1V1, a2 = p
2
aλ
2
2V2.
Using equation (2.15) we can compare the Nash equilibrium war efforts of the two
countries under different scenarios on the extent on asymmetry between the two countries.
Case 1: Benchmark case: Two countries are perfectly symmetric i.e,
L1 = L2, V1 = V2, λ1 = λ2, y1 = y2.
In this case from (2.15) we get:10[
B
(w1 + w2)2
+
a(w1 + w2)
w21w
2
2
]
(w2 − w1) = 0⇒ w1 = w2
As w1 = w2, we also have lc1 = lc2. The interpretation is straightforward that if two
countries are symmetric in all respects, in equilibrium their wage rate, war efforts and
winning probabilities will be same. Now we can compare the war efforts of two countries
when they are non-symmetric.
Case 2: Country 1 and country 2 are same in all respects except that the former possesses
a bigger resource stock than latter, i.e., y1 > y2, but L1 = L2, V1 = V2, λ1 = λ2.
In this case from (2.15) we get the same result as of case 1, that is w1 = w2, and thus
lc1 = lc2. It implies that even if the initial resource endowment is different between two
countries their equilibrium war efforts and winning probabilities will be same. In the
absence of property rights, insecurity neutralizes the effects of cross-sectional variation in
the resource endowment on individual countries’ war efforts. Hirshleifer (1991) calls this
tendency the paradox of power, that the relatively poorer side viewing the marginal return
from appropriation to be relatively higher than the marginal product from useful
production.
Case 3: Country 1 has a larger labor force than country 2, they are same in all other
aspects, i.e., L1 > L2, but V1 = V2, λ1 = λ2, y1 = y2.
10Under symmetry, a1 = a2 = a.
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In this case from (2.15) we get:[
B
(w1 + w2)2
+
a(w1 + w2)
w21w
2
2
]
(w2 − w1) = L1 − L2 ⇒ w1 < w2.
As w1 < w2, lc1 > lc2. The interpretation of this result is that a country with a
relatively larger labor force will have a lower wage rate. A lower wage rate implies lower
marginal cost or opportunity cost of conflict. Thus, a country with larger labor force (i.e.,
population) will exert more war efforts. This prediction is consistent with the empirical
findings that the countries with the larger population are more likely to engage in conflict
(Collier & Hoeﬄer 1998, 2004; Fearon, 2005).
Case 4: Country 1 has a larger endowment of land, but they are the same in all other
aspects, i.e., V1 > V2, but L1 = L2, λ1 = λ2, y1 = y2.
In this case from (2.15) we get:
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B +
p2aλ
2V1
w21
=
w1
(w1 + w2)2
B +
p2aλ
2V2
w22
,
which implies [
B
(w1 + w2)2
+
p2aλ
2V2(w1 + w2)
w21w
2
2
]
(w2 − w1) = p
2
aλ
2(V2 − V1)
w21
.
Thus, V1 > V2 ⇐⇒ w1 > w2 ⇐⇒ lc1 < lc2. A country with a large endowment of
productive land will have large agricultural sector. The demand for labor and employment
in the agricultural sector will be high, as a result wage rate will be high. A high wage rate
means higher opportunity cost of conflict and hence leads to lower level of war efforts. This
prediction is also supported by empirical findings that countries with low level of per capita
income tend to engage in more conflict (Collier & Hoeﬄer 1998, 2004; Fearon, 2005).
Case 5: Country 1 has higher productivity in agriculture sector than that of country 2,
they are same in all other aspects, i.e., λ1 > λ2, but L1 = L2, V1 = V2 = V, y1 = y2 .
This case is very similar to Case 5, and following similar arguments, we can show
that λ1 > λ2 ⇐⇒ w1 > w2 ⇐⇒ lc1 < lc2.
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2.4 EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS
Having discussed the equilibrium war efforts of the two countries, now we will discuss how
war efforts change with international sanctions on resource exports. A sanction on resource
exports reduces the export price received by the sanctioned country. Thus, we will examine
how war efforts change with the change in resource price. We consider different types of
sanctions on resource exports (for both countries and for one of the two countries): (i)
temporary sanction, (ii) sanction threat or expected future sanction, and (iii) permanent
sanction.
In order to simplify our analyses, we assume that two countries are symmetric so
that in the initial equilibrium w1 = w2 = w. Earlier we have also assumed that, at the
initial equilibrium, resource prices to be the same in the two periods (i.e, p1 = p2 = p).
In general, a change in the price of exports affects the war efforts directly for given
wage rates, and indirectly through change in wage rates.
We first look at how wage rates are affected by change in resource prices. Totally
differentiate equations (2.13) and (2.14) we get (see appendix B.4):
α1dw1 + α2dw2 = β1dp1 + γ1dp2, (2.16)
α3dw1 + α4dw2 = β2dp1 + γ2dp2, (2.17)
where
α1 = α4 =
2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a
8w3
,
α2 = α3 = − p
2
8w3
,
β1 = β2 = 0,
γ1 = γ2 =
wy − 2p
2w2
.
Equations (2.16) and (2.17) constitute a system of equations, and these give, for any
change in the prices in this system, the corresponding changes in w1 and w2 .
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Totally differentiating optimal lc1 and lc2 with respect to pt (t = 1, 2) we get:
dlc1
dpt
=
∂lc1
∂pt
+
∂lc1
∂w1
dw1
dpt
+
∂lc1
∂w2
dw2
dpt
, (2.18)
dlc2
dpt
=
∂lc2
∂pt
+
∂lc2
∂w1
dw1
dpt
+
∂lc2
∂w2
dw2
dpt
. (2.19)
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) state that a change in resource price changes the war
efforts of each country via three channels: first, it changes the war efforts directly; second,
it changes the wage rate of the country under consideration and thus changes the war
efforts; and third, it changes the wage rate of rival country and thus changes the war efforts
of the country. Now we examine the effects of sanctions on war efforts of the two countries.
(i) Temporary sanction: A temporary sanction on resource exports reduces the price of
resource in period 1, p1, in the international market. If only p1 changes, solving the system
of equations (2.16) and (2.17) we get the changes in w1 and w2 as follows (see appendix
B.5):
∆.
dw1
dp1
= β1α4 − β2α2, ∆.dw2
dp1
= β2α1 − β1α3,
where ∆ = α1α4 − α2α3 > 0 from the Walrasian stability of the labor market. Under the
assumptions of symmetry (w1 = w2 = w) and p1 = p2 = p, we get β1 = β2 = 0 (see the
expressions after equation (2.17)), and thus dw/dp1 = 0.
Now the change in conflict efforts of each country for a change in p1 is (see appendix
B.6.1):
dlc
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
= − p
w2
< 0. (2.20)
This result implies that a temporary current sanction that reduces the price of
resource in period 1 will increase conflict efforts of both countries.11 In this case, reduction
in resource price decreases extraction of resources in the period 1, leaving more prize for
conflict. Wage rate may increase or decrease depending on the relative price of resource in
two periods. A change in wage rate may increase or decrease the conflict depending on the
11This result holds even if two countries are non-symmetric. This is because if p1 = p2, β1 = β2 = 0. In
this case, dw1/dp1 = dw2/dp1 = 0 i.e., a temporary change in resource price will not affect wage rate. Then
dlc/dp1 = ∂lc/∂p1 < 0.
53
resource stocks. However, overall effect of temporary resource price decrease on conflict is
positive. Thus, temporary sanction is counter-productive.
Now suppose international community imposes sanction to one country, say country
1. It implies that in period 1 the resource price for country 1, p11, will fall. But, the
resource price for country 2, p12, will be unchanged. Now under the assumption of
symmetry, from (2.16) and (2.17) we get (see appendix B.6.2):
dw1
dp11
= − dw2
dp11
=
2pw
8a+ p (2wy − 3p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0,
and the change in war efforts of country 1 is:
dlc1
dp11
= − p
2w2
− p
2(2wy − 3p)
2w2[8a+ p(2wy − 3p)] < 0, (2.21)
since lc = p(2wy − 3p)/4w2 > 0 ⇒ 2wy − 3p > 0.
Equation (2.21) implies that temporary sanction on one country is surely
counter-productive in the sense that it increases the war efforts of that country. In this
case, a reduction of resource price for country 1 decreases extraction of that country and
thus induces more conflict efforts. Decrease in resource price for country 1 reduces wage
rate in country 1 and increases wage rate in country 2 (as their conflict efforts increases).
The combined effects on the changes in two wage rates is negative on the conflict. Thus,
overall effect of temporary sanction on one country must be negative on that country.
Now we will examine how the war efforts of the other country changes if a temporary
sanction is imposed on one country. In this case the change in war efforts of country 2 as a
result of sanction on country 1 is as follows (see appendix B.6.3):
dlc2
dp11
=
−8ap
2w2[8a+ p(2wy − 3p)] < 0, (2.22)
since 2wy − 3p > 0.
Equation (2.22) indicates that a temporary sanction on country 1 increases the war
efforts of country 2 as well. This is because a reduction of extraction in country 1 increases
conflict prize, thus induces more war efforts by country 2. Decrease in wage rate in country
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1 and increase in wage rate in country 2 together reduces the country 2’s war efforts
somewhat. But, negative effect dominates positive effect, yielding a net increase in war
efforts.
Thus, the policy implication is that if resource extraction is endogenous during the
conflict, a temporary sanction on resource exports is always counter-productive.
(ii) An anticipated future sanction: Suppose the international community announces
a sanction threat to the warring countries that it will impose sanction on resource exports
if the resources are acquired by war. If the threat is credible then warring countries would
expect resource price in period 2, p2, to fall. If only p2 changes then by solving the system
of equations (2.16) and (2.17) we get:
∆.
dw1
dp2
= γ1α4 − γ2α2, ∆.dw2
dp2
= γ2α1 − γ1α3
If two countries are symmetric and if initially p1 = p2 = p, we get the change in wage
rate with respect to p2 as follows (see appendix B.6.4):
dw
dp2
=
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
,
Then the change in war efforts of each country with respect to p2 would be as follows:
dlc
dp2
=
∂lc
∂p2
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp2
=
4a
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − p) +p2
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(2wy − 3p)
w2Λ
> 0,
(2.23)
since wy − p > 2wy − 3p > 0, and Λ = p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a > 0 (see appendix B.5).
Equation (2.23) implies that an anticipated future sanction on resource exports
reduces the conflict efforts of the countries involved in conflict. In this case, an expected
reduction of resource price in period 2 reduces expected conflict prize, thus diminishes war
efforts. Wage rate may increases or decreases in each country depending on the level of
resource stock. War efforts may increase or decrease with the change in wage rate
depending on the level of resource stock. But, whatever the effects of wage change on
conflict, overall conflict efforts fall due to decrease in resource price in period 2. Thus, an
anticipated future sanction is effective in reducing the intensity of conflict in our model.
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Now suppose international community declares sanction threat to only one country,
say country 1. It implies that in period 2 the resource price for country 1, p21, will fall.
But, the resource price for country 2, p22, will be unchanged. Again if two countries are
symmetric and initially p1 = p2 = p, from (2.16) and (2.17) we get (see appendix B.6.5):
dw1
dp21
=
w(wy − 2p)[2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a]
Ω
,
dw2
dp21
=
w(wy − 2p)3p2
Ω
.
Then the change in war efforts of country 1 with respect to p21 is as follows:
dlc1
dp21
=
4p2(p(2wy − 3p) + 8a)
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − 2p) +Θ
4w2Ω
,
(2.24)
where Ω = (p(2wy− 3p) + 8a)Λ > 0, Θ = [p2(2wy− 3p) + 16a(wy− p)]Λ + 8p2a(wy− p) > 0
(as we have shown earlier that wy − p > 2wy − 3p > 0, and Λ > 0).
Note, the sufficient condition for dlc1/dp21 > 0 is y > 2p/w. This condition satisfies if
∂w1/∂p21 = γ11 > 0 i.e., if wage rate in country 1 falls due to decrease in expected future
price of resources. A decrease in p21 due to sanction on country 1 reduces conflict efforts of
the country, but it also increases extraction in the current period. Whether wage rate will
falls, it depends on the relative magnitude of two effects. γ11 > 0 also implies that wage
rate in country 2 will increase and thus tend to increase the war efforts of country 1.
However, if resource stock is sufficiently high, the overall effect of anticipated future
sanction on conflict efforts will be positive (i.e., an anticipated future sanction on one
country will reduce its’ war efforts). On the other hand, if resource stock is low, there is
possibility that an anticipated sanction can be counter productive.
The change in war efforts of country 2 with respect to p21 is (see appendix B.6.6):
dlc2
dp21
=
p2(p(2wy − 3p) + 6pwy + 48a)
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − 2p)
8w2Ω
(2.25)
In this case, dlc2/dp21 > 0 if and only if y > 2p/w. In our model, if two countries are
symmetric future sanction on country 1 will not affect the conflict efforts of country 2
directly. However, changes in wage rates of country 1 and country 2 will affect the war
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efforts of country 2. If y > 2p/w, wage rate in country 1 falls and wage rate of country 2
increases, and then the war efforts of country 2 falls. Thus, an anticipated future sanction
on country 1 will reduce the war efforts of country 2 only if resource stock is sufficiently
high. On the other hand, if resource stock is low, then anticipated sanction on country 1
will increase the war efforts of country 2.
(iii) Permanent sanction: Suppose initially p1 = p2 = p. A permanent sanction implies
that price of resource falls in both period 1 and period 2. If two countries are symmetric,
the change in wage rate with respect to price will be (see appendix B.6.7):
dw
dp
=
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
Then the change in war efforts of each country with respect to price would be as follows:
dlc
dp
=
∂lc
∂p
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp
=
4a
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wy − 3p)
w2Λ
(2.26)
In this case, dlc/dp > 0 iff y > 3p/w. Thus, a permanent sanction on resource exports
reduces the war efforts of the countries only if the resource stock is sufficiently high. A
current sanction increases the war efforts, while a future sanction reduces the war efforts.
Which effect will dominate, it depends on the resource stock.
The above analyses imply that whether sanctions on resource exports will be
effective in reducing war intensity depends on the types of sanctions. A temporary sanction
is not effective, an anticipated future sanction might be effective, and finally the effect of
permanent sanction is uncertain.
2.5 UNCERTAIN FUTURE SANCTION
In section 2.3, we derive the equilibrium levels of conflict efforts without considering any
possibility of future sanction. In this section the question is: if the warring nations
anticipate that international community will impose a sanction, what happens to the levels
of conflicts? In particular, we assume that the warring countries are uncertain about
possible sanction, they only know the probability of sanction being imposed. For simplicity,
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we only examine the case when the second period sanction is uncertain and no sanction in
the first period. Suppose, the countries consider that probability of future sanction is θ,
and expected future price of resources under sanction is p′2 . In this case, the expected total
income of country i will be:
E(I i) = θ
[
wiLi + wi
(
p1 − qip′2
wi
)2
+
lci
lci + lcj
p′2
(
yi + yj − 2p1 − qjp
′
2
wj
)
+wi
(
p2aλ
2
iVi
w2i
)
− wilci
]
+ (1− θ)
[
wiLi + wi
(
p1 − qip2
wi
)2
+
lci
lci + lcj
p2
(
yi + yj − 2p1 − qjp2
wj
)
+ wi
(
p2aλ
2
iVi
w2i
)
− wilci
]
,
(i = 1, 2, and j 6= i). (2.27)
Each government maximizes E(I i) to choose lci. Then the first order condition for lci
is:
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
θp′2
[
yi + yj − 2p1 − qip
′
2
wi
− 2p1 − qjp
′
2
wj
− 2p
′
2
wj
.
lci
(lci + lcj)
]
+
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
(1− θ)p2
[
yi + yj − 2p1 − qip2
wi
− 2p1 − qjp2
wj
− 2p2
wj
.
lci
(lci + lcj)
]
= wi, (i = 1, 2, and j 6= i).
(2.28)
Equation (2.28) gives us the reaction functions for the two countries. Using these, we
get the following relationship between lc1 and lc2 :
w1lc1 = w2lc2 ⇔ lc2 = w1
w2
lc1 (2.29)
Using the above relationship, we can derive optimal lc1 and lc2 in terms of wage rates
and exogenous parameters as follows
l˜c1 =
w2
(w1 + w2)2
D, l˜c2 =
w1
w2
l˜c1 =
w1
(w1 + w2)2
D,
where
D = θp′2
(
y1 + y2 − 2p1
w1
+
2p′2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
− 2p1
w2
+
2p′2w1
w2(w1 + w2)
− 2p
′
2
w1 + w2
)
+(1− θ)p2
(
y1 + y2 − 2p1
w1
+
2p2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
− 2p1
w2
+
2p2w1
w2(w1 + w2)
− 2p2
w1 + w2
)
.
Again, if we assume that two countries are symmetric (i.e., w1 = w2 = w ), and at
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the initial equilibrium p1 = p2 = p, then the equilibrium war efforts of each country will be
(see appendix B.7):
l˜c =
p(2wy − 3p) + θ(p′2 − p2)(2wy − 3p+ p′2)
4w2
Note, without any anticipated sanction the equilibrium war effort of each country is:
lc =
p(2wy − 3p)
4w2
Since p′2 < p2, and 2wy − 3p > 0, l˜c < lc. Thus, probability of future sanction on
both countries reduces the equilibrium war efforts of each country. The higher the
probability of sanction, the lower the equilibrium war efforts. This result is consistent with
our comparative static result in the case of certain future sanction on both countries that a
future sanction reduces conflict efforts (see equation (2.23)).
2.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we develop a two-country, two-period general equilibrium model linking
natural resources to inter-state war. Contrary to the existing literature we consider
resource extraction and wage rates to be endogenous. First of all, we examine the relative
war efforts of two non-symmetric countries. We find that regardless of initial possession of
resource stocks the war efforts of two countries will be same; a country with larger labor
force exerts more war efforts; and a country with larger land endowment or higher
productivity exerts lower war efforts (i.e., paradox of power). Second, we examine the
effects of different types of international sanctions on war efforts of the two countries. We
find that a temporary current sanction on both countries or even on one country will be
counter-productive (i.e., increases the war intensity); an anticipated future sanction on
both countries will reduce war intensity; whether an anticipated future sanction on one
country will reduce war intensity depends on the level of resource stock; and finally, the
effect of a permanent sanction on both countries is uncertain and war intensity will fall
only if the resource stocks of the countries are sufficiently high.
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The broad policy prescription of our analysis is that while implementing trade
sanction, the international community needs to work out the exact nature of the sanction,
and a future sanction may be more effective than a current one. Current sanction can in
fact increase war efforts. Furthermore, taking sides in a conflict by imposing sanction on
one of the warring countries can increase war intensities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ON THE DURATION
OF CIVIL CONFLICTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The internal conflicts or civil wars are not only common, they are also persistent. Almost
90% of the last decade’s civil wars took place in countries that had already experienced a
civil war in the last 30 years (World Development Report, 2011). The average duration of
civil wars is quite large compared to that of inter-state wars. For example, while Bennett
and Stam (1996) find that international wars last on an average 11 months, Collier et al.
(2004) find that average civil war duration is 7 years in their dataset, and Fearon (2004)
finds that average civil duration is even longer of about 12 years in their sample.1 The
negative consequences of civil wars are not only limited within the boundary of a country,
they also affect the regional and international community. Thus, containment of conflicts is
crucial not only for the countries under conflicts, but also for regional and international
security and stability (both political and economic). Considering the longevity and adverse
consequences of civil wars, international community has been intervening in civil wars in
different ways.
The literature so far has pointed out many factors that determine the duration of
civil conflicts. These factors include level of income, income inequality, natural resource
abundance, geographic characteristics, ethnic fractionalizations, types of conflicts, outside
interventions etc. (e.g., Collier et al., 2004; Fearon and Lation, 2003; Fearon, 2004; Regan,
2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006). Not all studies support on the statistical significance and
economic significance of each factor, but there is a general consensus on a series of
structural factors and outside interventions that influence the expected duration of
1The difference in average duration of civil wars in two studies arises from the fact that they define civil
war differently and their sample periods are different also. While Collier et al. (2004) define civil war in
terms of 1000 deaths per year and cover the period of 1960-99, Fearon (2004) defines civil war in terms of
1000 deaths for entire war and cover the period of 1945-1999.
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conflicts. In this study we focus on the role of international sanctions as a determinant of
the length of civil wars.
Historically economic sanctions (sticks) are most commonly used instrument by the
international community to discourage conflicts. For example, sanctions have targeted
countries experiencing civil war, such as Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, Lebanon, Cambodia, and
Yugoslavia (Escriba`-Folch, 2010). Though the effectiveness of sanction is debatable, the
incidence of sanctions imposed has increased significantly over the last two decades,
especially those imposed by UN Security Council. The findings of the papers that examine
the effects of sanctions so far are rather mixed and inconclusive, as will be discussed in the
next section. Thus, in this chapter we re-examine the effects of sanctions on civil war
duration with a new and larger dataset.
In our study we use civil war data for the period of 1960-2008, which include 121
civil war incidences occurring in 67 countries. By using hazard model of duration analysis
we examine the effects of international sanctions on the expected duration of civil wars.
While Escriba`-Folch (2010) also studies the effects of sanctions on the likelihood of ending
conflicts, our study is different in several ways. First, we use a new and extended dataset
for the study. Escriba`-Folch uses the data from 1959 to 1999, whereas we use the data from
1960 to 2008. Note, after the end of cold war, UN and other international organizations
increased their policy interventions to terminate the civil conflicts. How this policy shift
has helped to settle the wars will be captured by our new data. We also use some relevant
control variables that are not used in Escriba`-Folch’s study. Second, while Escriba`-Folch
uses logit model for duration analysis, we use hazard model, which is more appropriate for
the duration analysis.2 Finally, previous literature did not consider the endogeneity of
sanction variable in determining war duration, we consider the issue in our paper and make
an attempt to deal with it.
Contrary to the most of the previous findings, we find that sanctions reduce the
2Most of the authors also use duration model to study the effects of interventions on duration of conflicts
e.g., Coller et al. (2004), Regan (2002), Regan and Aydin (2006).
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expected duration of civil conflicts. Our finding is robust for different controls, different
parametric models, and with consideration of endogeneity of sanctions. However, not all
types of sanction are equally successful in shortening conflicts. Total economic embargoes
and arms sanctions are effective, but trade sanctions, aid suspension, and other sanctions
do not work. Both multi-lateral and unilateral sanctions (mainly U.S. sanctions) are found
to be associated with shorter civil wars.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the existing
literature on the relationship between sanctions and conflicts. In section 3.3, we define our
variables and cite the data sources. Section 3.4 illustrates the model specification. In
section 3.5, we present and analyze our findings. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 SANCTIONS AND CONFLICTS
In the context of conflict, sanctions are generally methods of intervention based on coercive
measures imposed by a country, or an international organization, or a coalition of countries
against a country- the government or any group within a country or both- with the aim of
reducing the conflict (Escriba`-Folch, 2010). Again, sanctions have different degrees or
types, including total economic embargo, partial economic embargo, export/import
restrictions, cancellation of foreign aid, blockade, asset freeze, travel ban, and suspension of
economic agreement. In the past few decades, the use of economic sanctions has increased
substantially and sanctions have become the foreign policy tool of choice for many
countries. In 2012, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) has listed more
than 120 episodes of sanction during 1990 to 2010. In theory, the way sanctions work is
simple; sanctioned countries (called targets) suffer costs resulting from actions taken by the
sanctioning countries (called senders). In order to avoid the costs, targets modify their
behavior in the direction desired by the senders. Now the question is how successful the
economic sanctions are to shorten the conflicts in practice. The empirical studies find
mixed results as discussed below.
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Hafbauer et al., (1990) find very low success of sanctions to achieve intended
outcome. Assessing UN sanctions in the 1990s, Cortright and Lopez (2000) also show that
most of the sanctions failed to change the behavior of the targets. Pape (1997) argues that
sanctions basically do not work, only the use of military forces that accompany sanctions
may work. Analyzing 26 conflicts between 1989 and 2006, Le Billon and Nicholas (2007)
conclude that military intervention and revenue sharing are more successful than sanctions
in ending resource conflicts. However, they also find that sanctions and revenue sharing
promote durable peace compared to military interventions. Thyne (2006) finds that
sanctions have no significant effect on civil war onset. On the other hand, the existing
evidence on the impact of sanctions and or interventions on civil war duration is partial
and based on only limited number of cases (Strandow, 2006). Most of the empirical studies
suggest that outside interventions tend to extend the expected duration of civil wars. For
example, using a hazard model of duration analysis, Regan (2002) finds that third party
interventions tend to increase the expected duration of conflicts rather than shorten them.
Intervention may exacerbate wars by reducing the cost of rebellion (Elbadawi and
Sambian, 2000). Many studies even find that external or third party interventions make it
difficult to reach an agreement or a military victory and thus lengthen the conflict. For
example, Mason et al., (1999) find that third-party interventions make the negotiated
settlement more unlikely. Using Correlates of War (COW) data of civil conflicts and
external interventions, Balch-lindsay and Enterline (2000) find that biased interventions
increases the duration of war and balanced interventions tend to lengthen the war further.
Buhaug et. al., (2002) also find that intervention on the government side increases the
duration of civil war.
Many studies find that effectiveness of sanctions depend on different conditions: the
initial stability of the target and the cost of the target country (Davis and Radcliff, 1997),
the political regime of the target country (Noorunddin, 2002; Lektzian and Souva, 2007),
the sender’s perception about the importance of the issue (Ang and Peksen, 2007), the
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types of conflicts and resources involved in case of resource wars (Le Billon and Nicholas,
2007). Regan and Aydin (2006) argue that mediation/diplomacy and timing of
intervention are keys to the success of intervention in reducing the expected duration of
conflicts. However, some case studies as well as empirical studies find that external
interventions or sanctions are associated with the shorter intrastate conflict. For example,
the diamond embargo imposed on warring groups of Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Angola were effective in shortening the conflict (Escriba`-Folch, 2010; Wallensteen et
al., 2006). Using data on 55 civil wars between 1960 to 2000, Collier et al., (2004) show
that economic sanction has a positive but insignificant effect on the length of war, and only
military intervention on the rebel side shorten the war. Another study (using a sample of
213 wars and external interventions covering the period of 1867-1997) by Balch-Lindsay et
al., (2008) finds that third party interventions supporting one side reduces the time until
that group achieves victory, but it makes negotiated settlement more unlikely. In contrast,
according to DeRouen and Sobek (2004), an intervention by UN increases the probability
of truce and decrease the likelihood of one-sided victory. The strongest evidence of the
effectiveness of sanctions is found by Escriba`-Folch (2010). Using a sample of 87 wars
between 1959 to 1999, he finds that sanctions and their duration significantly reduce civil
war duration. He also shows that total economic embargoes are the most effective type of
sanctions, and sanctions imposed by international organizations increase the likelihood of
conflict resolution.
Many scholars also debate about what types of sanctions would be more effective:
comprehensive sanctions vs. smart sanctions. The comprehensive sanctions target the
whole country or use all type of instruments to maximize general costs. On the other hand,
smart sanctions target specific group or use specific instrument to avoid suffering of general
population. Most of the empirical evidences suggest that more comprehensive sanctions or
sanctions that impose higher costs on targets tend to be more successful (Cortright and
Lopez, 2002; Nooruddin, 2002; Hufbauer, 2007). On the other hand, Strandow (2006)
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argue that arms embargoes as they directly target the military capacity of the groups
would be more effective, if properly implemented.
Another issue regarding sanctions is what kinds of senders are more effective:
multilateral vs. unilateral. International sanctions are imposed either by multilateral
institutions (like UN, NATO, EU) or by a state (or a small coalition of them). Some
studies suggest that unilateral sanctions are more successful (e.g., Hufbauer et al., 1990;
Drezner, 1999), while other studies find that institutional sanctions are more effective (e.g.,
Bapat and Morgan, 2007; Escriba`-Folch, 2010).
Thus, there is no conclusive evidence either in favor of or against the effectiveness of
sanctions. That is why we re-examine the effects of sanctions on the duration of civil war
with a new and extended dataset. By using civil wars and sanctions data for the period of
1960-2008, we examine how the sanctions aiming to reduce civil conflict or imposed during
the civil conflict affect the expected duration of conflict or the likelihood of ending the
conflict. In the next section, we define our variables and discuss the sources of data.
3.3 VARIABLES AND DATA
One important aspect of civil war analysis is the definition of civil war, as different datasets
code civil war differently. For example, the Correlates of War (COW) definition of civil
wars is based on four main characteristics.3 It requires that there is organized military
action and that at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted in a given year. In order to distinguish
wars from genocides, massacres and pogroms there has to be effective resistance, at least
five percent of the deaths have been inflicted by the weaker party. A further requirement is
that the national government at the time was actively involved. On the other hand, the
Peace Research Institute Oslo/Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, known as UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
3The Correlates of War project is an academic study of the history of warfare. It was started in 1963 at
the University of Michigan by political scientist J. David Singer. The detail discussion of the dataset can be
found in www.correlatesofwar.org.
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Dataset (first complied by Nils Petter Gleditsch et al , 2002) define conflict as a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least
25 battle-related deaths.4 Their definition has two main dimensions. First, they distinguish
four types of violent conflicts according to the participants and location: (1) extra-systemic
conflicts (essentially territorial includes both colonial and imperialist wars), (2) interstate
wars (between two or more states), (3) intrastate wars (between the government of a state
and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states) and
(4) internationalized intrastate wars (between the government of a state and one or more
internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one
or both sides). The second dimension defines the level of violence. Minor conflicts produce
between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year, and wars are conflicts which
result at least 1,000 battle related deaths per year. Civil wars are considered as all armed
conflicts except interstate wars. For our analysis we use the PRIO/UCDP definition of civil
conflicts (i.e., include both minors and wars), as it is used by most of the recent empirical
literature on civil war.
To determine the duration of civil war, start date and end date of war as well as
choice of death thresholds are important. Different datasets record different start date and
end date of civil wars. Even start year and end year are different depending on the
definition and death threshold. Higher death threshold reduces the length of civil wars and
lower death threshold increases the duration. Furthermore, a higher threshold leads to a
higher number of repeat war episodes, while lower threshold may record it as one war
episode. For our analysis we use only the yearly information of civil war duration according
to UCDP civil war criteria.
We use data on civil conflicts for the period of 1960 to 2008 (see Table 3.1 in
4The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a data collection project on organized violence housed
at Uppsala University in Sweden. The first release of the Armed Conflict Dataset was prepared at PRIO in
2002.
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appendix C for the list of wars). Civil conflicts data are collected and combined from
Escriba`-Folch (2010) replication data (up to 1999), the COW dataset, and UCDP dataset.
Our data include 121 civil war incidences occurring in 67 countries. For duration analysis
our dependent variable consists of two variables: analysis variable and event (failure)
variable. Our analysis variable is civil war duration, which is number of years a civil war
has survived or is surviving (if the war is ongoing) up to a given year. Our event variable is
whether or not war ends in a given year, and we use a dummy variable namely ‘war end’
which is coded 1 if the war ends and 0 otherwise.
Our main explanatory variables are sanctions. Data on sanctions are collected from
Escriba`-Folch (2010) replication data, which has data for the period of 1959-1999. These
data are compared, amended, and widened using few more datasets: Hufbauer, Schott &
Elliott’s (2008) dataset, Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset, and German
Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) dataset. We use a dummy variable called
‘sanction’, coded as 1 if a country under any type(s) of sanction in a given year, 0
otherwise. The TIES dataset classifies sanctions according to the types of measures. We
construct five sanction variables as follows: total economic embargo, multilateral arms
embargo, trade sanction (imports and exports restrictions), aid suspension, and other
measures (e.g., blockade, asset freeze, travel ban, suspension of economic agreement). As
mentioned before, sanctions can be multi-lateral or institutional (e.g., imposed by UN, EU,
or other multilateral organizations) or it can be unilateral (imposed by a country). To
capture whether the effects of these two types of sanction are different, we construct two
more sanction variables: one is ‘unilateral sanction’, which takes the value 0 if no sanction,
1 if a country is under sanctions imposed by a country; and another is ‘multi-lateral
sanction’, which takes 0 if no sanction, 1 if a country is under sanctions imposed by an
international institution or group of countries. Some sanctions were jointly imposed by US
and UN, or US and EU, or by all three. In this case, we regard it as multi-lateral sanction.
We use a set of country-year control variables that are used in the literature in the
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studies on civil war onset and duration. Collier et al. (2004) argue that structural
characteristics of the economy like level of income and distribution of income affect the
duration of civil war. Thus, we use per capita GDP and Gini-coefficient measure of income
inequality as control variables. Many studies show that the abundance or dependence of
natural resources and primary commodities affect both the onset and duration of civil war
(e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002, 2004; Collier et al.,2004; Ross, 2004). We use several
alternative measures of resource abundance/dependence: ratio of primary commodity
exports to GDP, oil rent as percentage of GDP, mineral exporter (take the value 1 if
mineral exports in any year exceeded 50%, 0 otherwise), oil exporter (coded as 1 if oil
exports exceeds one-third of total exports, 0 otherwise), oil production per capita (in
barrels), diamond production per capita or per square kilometer (in carats). Civil wars
tend to be longer if the rebels have the opportunity to finance contraband (Fearon, 2004).
Thus, we include a dummy variable labeling ‘contraband’ for use of contraband in civil war
(taking the value 1 if the war is financed by contraband, 0 otherwise). Some researchers
argue that ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalizations may affect civil war (Collier et
al., 2004; Fearon and Latin, 2003). We use Fearon (2004) measure of ethnic
fractionalization, which measures the probability that two randomly selected person from a
country will not belong to the same ethnic group. Similarly religious fractionalization is
defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals are from different
religious groups. Geographic characteristics like proportion of mountainous terrain and
jungles also affect the duration of civil war (Buhaug et al., 2005). So we include two
separate variables to capture the geographic characteristics: the proportion of mountainous
area in total area, the proportion of forests in total area. Government military capacity
definitely affect the duration of civil war. Thus, we include the size of army (per 1,000
inhabitants) to represent the government capability to fight. However, the effects of
government capability might be quadratic i.e., civil wars might be short for very week and
very strong government. Thus, we also include square of army size as explanatory variable.
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Regan (2002) argue that third party or external intervention on either government side or
rebel side or both sides affect the duration of civil war. We include a dummy variable
called ‘external intervention’, which is coded as 1 for the year the country is under some
sort of external military intervention. Fearon (2004) shows that some categories of civil war
tend to last longer than others. We consider two types of civil war variables: ‘ethnic war’
which takes value 1 if the ongoing war is an ethnic nature and 0 otherwise, and ‘sons of
soil’ conflict (dummy variable tanking 1 or 0) that typically involves land conflict between
a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group.
Other relevant control variables that are used in our paper include: country’s population,
average battle related death per year, and polity 2 (polity IV project).
The data for our control variables are collected from different sources (see Table 3.2
for the list of variables and data sources). We use data of many control variables from
Escriba`-Folch (2010) replication dataset, Fearon & Lation (2003) dataset, and Fearon
(2004, and 2005) dataset. These variables include primary commodity exports, mineral and
oil exporters, oil and diamond productions, ethnic and religious fractionalizations, the use
of contraband, mountainous terrain, army size, ethnic war, sons of soil war. We extend
these datasets using other sources whenever required. We collect population and per capita
GDP data from World Bank and Pen World Table 7.1. Gini-coefficient, oil rents, and forest
area data are collected from World Bank’s World Development Indicator dataset. Battle
related death data are available at PRIO/UCDP dataset and Escriba`-Folch (2010)
replication dataset, we compare and contrast both datasets. External intervention data are
collected and combined from two sources: Cunnigham (2010), and Escriba`-Folch (2010).
Polity 2 data are collected from Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV project. Note, for
some time varying covariates the data of all years are not available. In those cases, we
interpolate the missing years’ data using the data of the closest years available.
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3.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The main objective of the study is to estimate the effects of sanctions on civil war duration
and the likelihood of ending the conflict. A useful way to think about the effect of
interventions (sanctions) on a conflict duration is as an intervention taking place at a
discrete point in time. As a result of an intervention, the conflict either remains at the
status quo condition or moves to an alternative state, which we will call the termination of
the conflict. The approach to testing such effects is to use a duration, or hazard model
(Allison, 1984; Bennett, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Generally, a hazard
model allows us to determine the likelihood of a transition to state ti , given it is at state
t0, for a series of explanatory variables. For conflict duration analysis, the hazard model
estimates the time elapsed up to time t and the risk of conflict termination at t.
We use an event history approach to model the expected duration of civil conflicts.
Among the competing parametric models of hazard (or survival) analysis, we have chosen
to test the model with a Weibull parameterization.5 The Weibull model allows us to test
for duration dependency in the termination of civil conflict, which is an advantage over
other event history analysis methods. Without any covariates, the basic functional form of
the hazard rate, h(t), using a Weibull specification is the following:
h(t) = λp (λt)p−1 = λpptp−1; t > 0, p > 0, λ > 0, (3.1)
where h(t) is the estimated hazard rate at time t, p is the shape parameter, and λ is the
positive scale parameter. The parameter p accounts for duration dependence. When p = 1,
there is no duration dependence, and the hazard rate h(t) is constant (λ). When 0 < p < 1,
the hazard rate decreases monotonically over time. When p > 1, the hazard rate increases
monotonically, although not necessarily linearly. Covariates X (independent variables) can
5There are alternative specifications of hazard model, e.g., Exponential model, Gompertz model, Log
logistic model, Log normal model, Cox proportional hazard model. Each model makes different assumptions
about duration dependence. The advantage of Weibull specification is that it does not assume a functional
form of the dependence parameter, instead allows one to test for the existence of duration dependence.
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be added into the model as influences on the hazard rate by specifying the following:
h(ti) = λ
p
i pt
p−1 = h0(t)λ
p
i , and λi = e
−βXi , (3.2)
where h0(t) is called baseline hazard, when all covariates are zero.
6 Positive β implies that
hazard decreases and average survival time increases as X increases.
For our cross-sectional time series analysis of war duration, we specify the following
proportional hazard model:
h(ti/Iit, Cit) = pt
p−1.exp(βIit + γCit) (3.3)
In this functional form, h(.) reflects the rate at which a civil conflict terminates at time t
given that it has survived until t, p is the duration dependency parameter, I is the vector
denoting interventions (sanctions), and C is the vector denoting control variables. β and γ
represent the vectors of the coefficients on the variables of interest. Positive duration
dependency (p > 1) suggests that the conflict is more likely to terminate with the passing
of time, whereas negative duration dependency (0 < p < 1) suggests the institutionalization
of the conflict: as the adversaries continue fighting, their chances of settling the conflict
also decrease over time. Note, our explanatory variables include both time invariant and
time-varying covariates. Thus, we estimate a hazard model that accounts for the impact of
a series of covariates on the expected duration of a conflict. For estimation purpose we use
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method.
Previous studies on the effectiveness of sanctions ignore the possibility of endogeneity
of the sanction variable. However, we consider this issue in our paper. There might be two
possible sources of endegeneity in our sanction variable: 1) selection bias - the threat of
sanction might be more effective than imposed sanction, and 2) omitted variable bias -
unobserved factors may affect both sanctions and war duration, which are not included as
regressors in our model. These unobserved factors include political grievance, culture,
institutions, poverty, relationship with other countries, international geo-political situation,
6The above model allows for the presence of an intercept term, β0, within Xi. Thus, the baseline hazard
function is actually equal to h0(t).exp(β0).
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international institutions, and the like.
To test for selection bias, we include a dummy variable called ‘non-imposed sanction
threat’ (take the value 1 if a country is threatened but eventually sanctions are not
imposed, 0 if no threat or sanction is applied) as a regressor in our model, and test whether
non-imposed sanction threat affect the war duration. To test for unobserved heterogeneity,
we estimate the the frailty model of hazard function, which test for unobserved variation in
the hazard rate. A frailty model is a survival model with unobservable heterogeneity, or
frailty. At the observation level, frailty is introduced as an unobservable multiplicative
effect, α, on the hazard function, such that h(t/α) = αh(t). The frailty, α, is a random
positive quantity and, for model identiability, is assumed to have mean 1 and variance θ.
We test the presence of unobserved heterogeneity by the likelihood ratio test of H0 : θ = 0.
According to Masuhara (2013), in case of duration model, only controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity is not sufficient to deal with endogeneity. It is important to
consider both heterogeneity and endogeneity in duration analysis. One possible source of
endogeneity is reverse causality. Sanctions may go to the conflicts that international
community perceive would be long-lasting. In this case causation run in opposite direction
and we may find a positive association between sanctions and war duration. To deal with
endogeneity problem we need to find proper instrument(s).7 Even if one find an
instrument, there is no established or standard methodology for applying instrumental
variable technique in case of duration model in particular and nonlinear model in general.
Terza et al. (2008), and Atiyat (2011) suggest a two-stage regression method, like two-stage
least squares (2SLS) technique in case of linear models. In the first-stage, the endogenous
variable is regressed on the appropriate instrumental variable(s) and other exogenous
regressors in the system. An appropriate non-linear model is used to estimate this
first-stage model and residuals are estimated from it. The first-stage residuals are used as a
7A good instrument must satisfy the following three conditions: (1) it cannot be correlated with first-stage
disturbance term, (2) it must be sufficiently correlated with endogenous regressor for which it is used (i.e. it
must not be ‘weak’), and (3) it can neither have a direct influence on dependent variable nor be correlated
with the error term in second-stage regression.
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regressor along with endogenous regressor and other variables in the second-stage
regression. This is called two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method. Terza et al. (2008),
and Atiyat (2011) show that 2SRI method produces consistent estimators.8
For our sanction variable, we consider two possible instruments: i) post-cold war
period, ii) Security Council membership of the conflict affected country. The episodes of
sanctions have increased significantly after the end of cold war. This is because the end of
cold war has given more freedom to both US and UN Security Council to impose sanctions
without opposition from the former USSR. We construct a dummy variable ‘post-cold war’,
which takes the value 1 if the conflict year is 1990 or later, 0 otherwise. Thus, we expect a
positive relationship between sanctions and ‘post-cold war’ variables. We consider
temporary membership of a country in the Security Council (SC) is an indicator of good
international relationship of the country. We expect that a country will less likely to be
under sanction, if it has the membership in the SC during the war years. We generate a
variable called ‘non-membership in SC’, taking the value 1 if the country is not a member
of the SC any time during the war, 0 otherwise.9 Thus, we expect a positive relationship
between sanctions and ‘non-membership in SC’ variables.
As an alternative specification, we also estimate the logit model to test how
sanctions affect the likelihood of war termination.10 However, we think that hazard model
is more appropriate for our case. Note, logit model is appropriate for discrete time analysis
and if the event is not duration dependent. However, if the duration of time leading up to
the event is important, as is the case of civil war, then event history or hazard model is
more appropriate. Moreover, event history model performs better than logit model if there
8They also show that in this case two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) method, which is the rote
extension to nonlinear models of 2SLS method, does not provide consistent estimators. In the first-stage
of 2SPS, auxiliary (reduced form) regressions are estimated, and the results are used to generate predicted
values for the endogenous variables. The second-stage regression is then conducted for the outcome equation
of interest after replacing the endogenous variables with their predicted values.
9Information of Security Council membership is available on UN website
10In our case, we specify the following logit model: Prob.(warendit = 1/Iit, Cit, αi) = Φ(α0 + αi + βIit +
γCit), where Φ(.) is logistic cumulative distribution, warendit is a country-year dummy variable taking the
value 0 if the war is ongoing and 1 if the war ends.
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Figure 3.1: Survival Probabilities of Wars Over Time
are time varying covariates in regression. Truncation and censoring can also be better dealt
with event history model. Censoring, especially right censoring is important for civil war
because some of the wars in the sample might be ongoing even if the sample period ends.11
Thus, for our study the preferred model is event history model/hazard model. The logit
model is used for robustness check of our estimates.
3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The mean war duration of all civil wars in our sample is 10 years. Thus, as mentioned
before, on average civil wars are long-lasting. The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival
functions of conflicts under sanctions versus conflicts without sanctions are shown in Figure
3.1.12 In this Figure, the y-axis represent the probability of a conflict ongoing at any given
time, and x-axis shows the number of years the conflict is ongoing. The survival curves
indicate that the civil wars become slightly less likely to survive with each passing year.
Moreover, survival probabilities are lower for the conflicts with sanctions than those
11In our study, at the end of 2008, 16 wars were still ongoing. Hazard model takes in to account all these
wars in the analysis of duration of wars.
12Kaplan-Meier estimator of survival function: S(ti) = Π(1−di/ni), where ni is the number of observation
at risk, and di is the number of event (i.e., di/ni is the hazard rate).
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without sanctions, except for very long conflicts. A statistical test - the log rank test for
the equality of survivor functions - demonstrates that the difference is statistically
significant. But only by this test we can not tell whether there are significant differences in
survival probabilities (i.e., expected duration of war) in two cases, because we have not
controlled for other determinants of war duration. To determine the causal relationship
between sanctions and expected war duration, we have to use regression analysis which
controls for other determinants of war duration. The regression results are presented in the
following sections.
3.5.1 EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS
At first, we examine the effects of all sanctions in general on the expected duration of civil
wars. We estimate the hazard rate of conflict termination using Weibull parameterization,
with the unit of analysis being the conflict year. The co-efficients of hazard rate are
presented to see whether hazard rate increases or decreases with a covariate.13
Table 3.3a reports the estimated coefficients of hazard rate for different regression
functions. We see that even without controlling for other covariates, the coefficient of
sanction variable is positive and statistically significant (model 1), which implies that
sanctions increase the hazard rate of war termination. As we add more and more relevant
control variables, the magnitude of sanction coefficient increases and become more
significant. Model (8) is our reference model, which we get after a series of iterations, in
which insignificant variables are deleted and only statistically significant socio-economic
variables are added to the regression.
Our reference model suggests that international sanctions significantly reduce the
expected duration of conflict. This result is robust to the inclusions of other control
13We can also present the results in proportional hazard (PH) metric and accelerated failure-time (AFT)
metric forms. PH metric shows the effects of explanatory variables on the hazard rate, whereas the AFT
metric shows the effects of explanatory variables on the expected duration of conflicts. In the PH model the
hazard function is h(tj) = h0(t)g(Xj) = h0(t)exp(Xjβ). On the other hand, in the AFT model, the natural
logarithm of the survival time, log t, is expressed as a linear function of the covariates, yielding the linear
model: log tj = Xjβ + zj , where zj is the error with density f().
76
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
Ha
za
rd
 fu
nc
tio
n
0 20 40 60
analysis time
sanction=1 sanction=0
Weibull regression
Figure 3.2: Estimated Hazard Rates of Wars Over Time
variables, like Gini-coefficient, external intervention, mountain, forests, ethnic and religious
fractionalizations, ethnic war, and polity2 (Table 3.4). The result is also robust to the use
of alternative measure of natural resource abundance (Table 3.5). Thus, contrary to the
most of the previous literature, our finding suggests that sanctions can reduce the war
duration. Note, Table 3.3a shows only the direction of change in hazard rate, it does not
show the estimated hazard rates. Table 3.3b reports the estimated hazard rates for the
corresponding models of Table 3.3a. The reference model (8) in Table 3.3b shows that
sanctions increase the hazard rate of war termination by 97% after controlling for all other
relevant variables. Figure 3.2 shows the estimated hazard functions for Wei-bull regression
with sanctions and without sanctions. We see that for each year hazard rate is significantly
higher under sanction compared to without sanction. From Table 3.3a we also see that the
estimate of shape parameter p is greater 1 (as log(p) is positive) and statistically
significant, which implies that hazard rate is increasing over time.
The interpretations for other statistically significant variables are as follows (see
Table 3.3a and Table 3.3b). A large population decreases the hazard rate of war
termination, implying that more populous countries tend to experience longer civil wars.
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Higher per capita income increases the expected duration of wars. One might suspect a
reverse causality from war duration to per capita income. To eliminate the possibility of
reverse causality, we run separate regression by including the initial level of per capita
income of a country for all war years instead of each country-year per capita income. But,
we find that the coefficient of per capita income is still negative and statistically significant.
This result implies that though lower per capita income is likely to increase risk of conflict
onset (e.g., Collier & Hoeﬄer, 1998, 2002; Fearon, 2005), a relatively higher per capita
income tend to lengthen the conflict, once conflict starts. Higher male secondary school
enrollment reduces the war duration. This finding is intuitive in the sense that higher male
secondary school enrollment decreases the opportunity for rebel recruits, as rebel groups
typically recruit fighters from young male. Natural resource abundance measured by both
‘oil rent to GDP ratio’ and ‘diamond production per capita’ reduces the war duration. A
possible interpretation is that higher resource availability increases the government revenue
and thus government can build a strong army, which helps the government to win war
within a short time. However, more resource rents might encourage rebel groups to fight
harder and longer, thus tend to lengthen the war. In our sample, probably first effect
dominates second one, resulting a net reduction of war duration. The opportunity of
contraband by rebel groups increase the expected duration of war. The interpretation is
straight forward in this case, that if the rebel groups can finance war through selling of
natural resources or drugs, they can fight longer wars. The coefficient of ‘Son of civil war’
is positive and significant, implying that these types of wars are comparatively longer than
other types of civil wars. Army size of country has a negative but diminishing effect on
hazard rate, implying that larger army size increases the war duration, but a very large
army can win war quickly. Higher battle related death tend to lengthen the war, implying
that more deaths increase the grievances among groups and lead to a lengthy war. More
neighbors with common borders tend to increase the expected duration of war.
Robustness Check: Table 3.4 presents regression equations by adding the other relevant
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control variables to our reference equation. We find that our estimates are robust in
general to the inclusion of others but statistically insignificant control variables. Contrary
to the findings of Collier & Hoeﬄer (2004), and Escriba`-Folch (2010), we find that ethnic
fractionalization does not affect the war duration. Similarly, the effect of religious
fractionalization is not statistically significant. Geographic characteristics, like mountain
and forest areas, are not statistically significant as well. Though Balch-lindsay and
Enterline (2000), and Regan (2002) find that external or third party intervention tend to
increase the war duration, we do not find such evidence in our estimation. Similar to most
of the previous findings, we find that regime type indicator variable ‘polity2’ is not
statistically significant for war duration.
We also check the robustness of our estimates by using alternative indicators for
resource abundance (Table 3.5). Instead of oil rent to GDP ratio, we use oil production per
capita, or oil exporter, or mineral exporter variables. We also use primary commodity
export to GDP ratio as an indicator of resource abundance replacing the oil rent to GDP
ratio.14 In all of the above cases, our estimates are found to be robust, except for the
‘number of border’ variable.
We also estimate some of the other parametric models of hazard function to see
which model fits the data best. Table 3.6 shows the estimates of different parametric
models: Wei-bull model, Exponential model, Gompertz model, and Cox proportional
hazard model. We see that Wei-bull model is the best fitting model with the highest log
likelihood value. Wei-bull model is also preferred model with the smallest AIC.15 We also
estimate the logit model to see how the likelihood of war termination is affected by the
sanctions (model 5 in Table 3.6). We see that the coefficient of sanction is positive and
statistically significant, implying that sanctions increase the probability of war termination.
Other variables have the same signs as with the hazard model.
14Many authors, including Collier & Hoeﬄer (1998, 2002, 2004), and Fearon (2005) use the primary
commodity export to GDP ratio as the indicator of resource abundance in their estimation.
15In this case, AIC = -2(log likelihood) + 2(c + p + 1), where c=number of covariates, p= the number of
model-specific ancillary parameters.
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Endogeneity of Sanctions: As discussed in section 3.4 our sanction variable may have
endogeneity problem. To deal with endogeneity, we do three tests: selection bias test,
unobserved heterogeneity test, and use instrumental variable technique. Table 3.7 presents
the results of endogeneity tests. To test for selection bias, we include the variable
‘non-imposed sanction threat’ as a regressor in our model, and we find that the variable is
not statistically significant (model 1). Thus, we do not find evidence of selection bias in our
estimation. To test for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate the the frailty model of
hazard function, which tests for unobserved variation in the hazard rate (model 2). Using
likelihood ratio test we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no unobserved variation. Thus,
we can claim that the unobserved heterogeneity is not present in our model.
To deal with endogeneity problem, we use 2SRI method (suggested by Terza et al.,
2008; and Atiyat, 2011) as described in section 3.4. First, we use ‘post-cold war’ variable as
a single instrument and find that it significantly affects the likelihood of imposing sanction
if we use logit regression (model 3). We estimate the residual from first-stage regression,
and then include it as a regressor in the second-stage regression. We find that the
coefficient of sanction variable increases significantly after correcting for endogeneity
(compare model 5 and model 7 in Table 3.7). This result implies that if we do not consider
reverse causality and endogeneity, the true co-efficient of sanctions will be underestimated.
Secondly, we use ‘non-membership in Security Council’ as a second instrument for sanction
in the first-stage regression. We find that both instruments significantly predict sanctions
(model 4). Again, we estimate residuals from the first-stage, and include it as a regressor in
the second-stage (model 6). We find similar results as with first case. Though the
coefficient of sanction is slightly lower in the second case, it is still significantly higher than
the case without considering endogeneity.
Since instrumental variable technique used in this paper is not standard, we can take
this result as indicative, rather than conclusive. However, our main finding does not change
in this case. Thus, contrary to the most of the previous finding, we show that international
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sanctions can reduce the expected duration of civil wars.
3.5.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SANCTIONS
In this section, we examine the effects of different types of sanctions: total economic
embargo, multilateral arms embargo, trade sanctions, aid end, and other sanctions. Table
3.8 presents the estimated coefficients of hazard rates for these sanctions. We find that the
coefficient of total economic sanction or comprehensive sanction is positive, large, and
statistically significant. This result implies that comprehensive sanctions that cut the total
flow of funds to the conflicting parties are very effective in reducing war duration. Our
results also show that arms embargo has positive and significant effect on hazard rate of
war termination. This implies that restrictions on the supply of arms to the warring parties
can lead to a shorter intra-state war. The coefficients of both trade sanction and aid end
are positive, but are not statistically significant. Thus, our results suggest that trade
sanctions and aid cancellation as tools for war termination are not effective. Others
sanctions such as blockade, asset freeze, travel ban, suspension of economic agreement do
not appear to have any significant effect on civil war duration. We also estimate the effects
of each category of sanctions individually without controlling for other categories (Table
3.10), and find that the coefficients of total economic embargo and arms sanction are still
positive and statistically significant.
We also estimate the effects of sanctions by dividing the sanctions according to the
types of senders of sanctions: unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Table 3.9 reports the
estimated results and we find that both multilateral and unilateral sanction have positive
and significant effects on hazard rate of war termination. Thus, our results suggest that
both multilateral and unilateral sanctions can reduce the duration of civil war. Note, in
our sample majority of the (89% of total unilateral sanctions) unilateral sanctions were
imposed by the United States. Since U.S. is the biggest military and economic power of the
world, sanctions imposed by that country has significant effect on civil war termination.
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We also run separate regression for these two types of sanctions, and find that the
coefficient of multi-lateral sanction is still positive and significant. The coefficient of
unilateral sanction though positive, but is not statistically significant.
3.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter examines empirically the effects of international sanctions on the duration of
civil conflicts. Using civil wars and sanctions data for the period of 1960 - 2008, we
estimate hazard rate of war termination due to sanctions. Contrary to the most of the
previous findings, we find that in general sanctions reduce the expected duration of civil
wars. However, not all types of sanction are equally successful in shortening conflicts.
Total economic embargoes and arms sanctions are effective, but trade sanctions, aid
suspension, and other sanctions do not work. Both multi-lateral and unilateral sanctions
(mainly U.S. sanctions) are associated with shorter civil wars. Thus, our results suggest
that in the current globalized system, sanction could be an effective tool for the
international community to reduce the duration of civil war.
Like most studies, our study is not without limitations. Our data on sanctions
include all the imposed sanctions during the conflict. We don’t have sufficient information
about whether these sanctions are imposed because of civil war or for some other reasons
(e.g., democracy, human rights issue, violation of international law). Our sanction variables
are dummy variables, they measure whether intervention is present or absent in a given war
or in a given year, they do not measure the extent of the intervention. But for practical
purpose the intensity of intervention might be an important determinant of war duration.
Another limitation is the potential endogenity of sanctions. To deal with the endogeneity,
we use a instrumental variable technique suggested by Terza et al. (2008), and Atiyat
(2011). Since there is no standard methodology to use instrumental variable technique in
case of hazard model, our results can be taken as indicative, rather than conclusive.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
A.1 DERIVATION OF (1.28)
The labor market equilibrium condition is as follows:
2
(2p1 − p2)2
4w2
+ 2
p2(wy + p2 − 2p1)
2w2
+
p2aV
w2
= L
2(2p1 − p2)2 + 4p2(wy + p2 − 2p1) + 4p2aV = 4w2L
2p2wy − 2w2L+ 4p21 + 3p22 − 8p1p2 + 2p2aV = 0
(A-1)
Totally differentiating equation (A-1) we get,
(p2y− 4wL)dw = −4(p1− p2)dp1− (wy− 4p1 + 3p2)dp2− 2paV dpa− p2wdy+ 2w2dL (A-2)
Substituting for L and rearranging we get,
∆dw = −4w(p1 − p2)dp1 − w(wy − 4p1 + 3p2)dp2 − 2wpaV dpa − p2w2dy + 2w3dL, (A-3)
where ∆ = (2p1 − p2)(3p2 − 2p1)− p2wy − 2p2aV . From equation (A-3) we get the changes
in w with respect to the changes in p1, p2, pa, y, and L of (1.28).
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
(a) Change in p1:
dlr
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∂lr
∂p1
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(A-4)
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(d) Change in y:
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A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof of (y − 4l
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From (1.14) we get,
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Derivation of ∂lc/∂w:
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A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Derivation of the changes in w with respect to changes in p1, y, pa, and L:
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(a) Change in p1:
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1
2
r − 3wlr + wyl
1
2
r )]
=
y − 4l
1
2
r
ΛΩ
[2p1wy − wlaΛ− 8p1wl
1
2
r ]
=
w(y − 4l
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[2p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )− laΛ]
=
w(y − 4l
1
2
r )
Ω
[
2p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )
Λ
− la]
(A-16)
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dlc
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dp1
=
p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r
wΛ
+
4p1l
1
2
r (w − p1l−
1
2
r ) + p1w(l
1
2
r − y)
w2Λ
.
w2(4l
1
2
r − y) + w(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)
Ω
=
p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r
wΛ
+
p1w(4l
1
2
r − y) + (p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)
w2Λ
.
w2(4l
1
2
r − y) + w(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)
Ω
=
1
w2ΛΩ
[(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )Ω + p1w
3(4l
1
2
r − y)2 + w2(4l
1
2
r − y)(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)
+ p1w
2(4l
1
2
r − y)(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y) + w(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)]
=
(y − 4l
1
2
r )
w2ΛΩ
[p1w
3(y − 4l
1
2
r )− w2(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)− p1w2(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)]
+
1
w2ΛΩ
[(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ) + w(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)(2wl
1
2
r − p1l−
1
2
r y)]
=
(y − 4l
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[p1wy − 7p1wl
1
2
r + p
2
1l
− 1
2
r y + 4p
2
1] +
1
w2ΛΩ
[−w2laΛ(p1yl−
1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )]
=
p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[4p1 + wy − 7wl
1
2
r + p1l
− 1
2
r y]− la
Ω
(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )
=
p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[p1l
− 1
2
r y + 3wl
1
2
r − 7wl
1
2
r + p1l
− 1
2
r y]− la
Ω
(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )
=
2p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
(p1l
− 1
2
r y − 2wl
1
2
r )− la
Ω
(p1yl
− 1
2
r − 2wl
1
2
r )
=
(p1l
− 1
2
r y − 2wl
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[2p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )− laΛ]
=
(p1l
− 1
2
r y − 2wl
1
2
r )
Ω
[
2p1(y − 4l
1
2
r )
Λ
− la]
(A-17)
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(b) Change in y:
dlr
dy
=
∂lr
∂y
+
∂lr
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
Λ
+
3lr − yl
1
2
r
Λ
.− w
2(p1 − wl
1
2
r ) + wl
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )2
Ω
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
ΛΩ
[Ω− w2(3lr − yl
1
2
r )− wl−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )(3lr − yl
1
2
r )]
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
ΛΩ
[p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ− w(3lr − yl
1
2
r )(−p1l−
1
2
r )]
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
ΛΩ
[p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ + (4p1l
1
2
r − p1y)p1l−
1
2
r ]
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
ΛΩ
[p1l
1
2
r (wlr − p1y)− wlaΛ] = p1 − wl
1
2
r
Ω
[
p1l
1
2
r (wlr − p1y)
Λ
− wla]
=
p1 − wl
1
2
r
Ω
[
p1l
1
2
r (wlr − p1y)
Λ
− wla]
(A-18)
dlc
dy
=
∂lc
∂y
+
∂lc
∂w
.
dw
dy
=
l
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )2
wΛ
− p1w(4l
1
2
r − y) + (p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)
w2Λ
.
w2(p1 − wl
1
2
r ) + wl
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )2
Ω
=
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )
wΛΩ
[l
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )Ω− p1w2(4l
1
2
r − y)− w(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)− p1w(4l
1
2
r − y)l−
1
2
r
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )− (p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)l−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )] =
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )
wΛΩ
[l
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ)
− p1w2(4l
1
2
r − y)− w(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)− p1w(4l
1
2
r − y)l−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )− (p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)l−
1
2
r
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )] =
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )
wΛΩ
[−wl−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )laΛ− p1w2(4l
1
2
r − y)− w(p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21)
− p1w(4l
1
2
r − y)l−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )] =
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[−l−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )laΛ + p1w(y − 4l
1
2
r )p1l
− 1
2
r
− p1wl
1
2
r + 4p
2
1] =
(p1 − wl
1
2
r )
ΛΩ
[−l−
1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )laΛ + p1l
− 1
2
r (p1y − wlr)]
=
l
− 1
2
r (p1 − wl
1
2
r )
Ω
[
p1(p1y − wlr)
Λ
− (p1 − wl
1
2
r )la]
(A-19)
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(c) Change in pa:
dla
dpa
=
∂la
∂pa
+
∂la
∂w
.
dw
dpa
=
2la
pa
+
[
−2la
w
.− w
2laΛ
paΩ
]
=
2la
pa
+
2wl2aΛ
paΩ
=
2la
paΩ
[Ω + wlaΛ]
=
2la
paΩ
[p1wl
1
2
r − 4p21 − wlaΛ + wlaΛ]
=
2p1la
paΩ
(wl
1
2
r − 4p1)
(A-20)
A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
When w is fixed : Totally differentiate (1.71) we get:
dR1 = p1l
− 1
2
r1 dlr1 − wdlr1 − wdlc1 +
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2(−l−
1
2
r1 dlr1 − l−
1
2
r2 dlr2)
+
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc1 −
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2
= [p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w −
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r1 ]dlr1 +
[
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)− w
]
dlc1
− lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlr2 −
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2
(A-21)
Using first order conditions of warlord 1, from (A-21) we get,
dR1 = − lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlr2 − wdlc2 (A-22)
Totally differentiate FOC of lr2 we get:
1
2lr2
(
lc2
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 − p1l−
1
2
r2 )dlr2 =
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlc2 −
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlc1 (A-23)
Using Nash equilibrium of lc1 = lc2, and assuming dlc1 = dlc2, from (A-23) we get, dlr2 = 0.
Then, from (A-22) we get, dR1 = −wdlc2. Similarly, we can derive that dR2 = −wdlc1
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When w is endogenous : Totally differentiate (1.71) we get:
dR1 = p1l
− 1
2
r1 dlr1 − lr1dw − wdlr1 − lc1dw − wdlc1 +
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2(−l−
1
2
r1 dlr1 − l−
1
2
r2 dlr2)+
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc1 −
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2
= [p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w −
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r1 ]dlr1 +
[
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)− w
]
dlc1
− lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlr2 −
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2 − (lr1 + lc1)dw
= − lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlr2 − wdlc2 − (lr1 + lc1)dw
(A-24)
Totally differentiate FOC of lr2 we get:
1
2lr2
(
lc2
lc1 + lc2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 − p1l−
1
2
r2 )dlr2 =
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlc2 −
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 dlc1 + dw
w
2lr2
dlr2 =
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2l
− 1
2
r2 (dlc1 − dlc2)− dw
(A-25)
If dlc1 = dlc2, then from (A-25) we get:
dlr2 = −2lr2
w
dw (A-26)
Similarly, totally differentiate FOC of lr1 we get:
dlr1 = −2lr1
w
dw (A-27)
Substituting (A-26) in to (A-24) we get:
dR1 =
[
lc1
lc1 + lc2
2p2l
1
2
r2
w
− (lr1 + lc1)
]
dw − wdlc2 (A-28)
If we assume p1 = p2 and use Nash equilibrium condition of lr1 = lr2, from (A-28) we get:
dR1 = (lr1 − lc1)dw − wdlc2 (A-29)
Similarly, totally differentiate (1.72) and using the same procedure we can get:
dR2 = (lr2 − lc2)dw − wdlc1 (A-30)
Totally differentiate labor market equilibrium condition we get:
dlr1 + dlr2 + dlc1 + dlc2 + dla = 0 (A-31)
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Substituting the values of dlr1, dlr2, and dla in to (A-31) we get:
4lri + 2la
w
dw = dlc1 + dlc2 ⇒ dw = w
2lri + la
dlci, i = 1, 2 (A-32)
Substituting (A-32) in to (A-29) and (A-30) we get respectively:
dR1 = −
(
lr1 + lc1 + la
2lr1 + la
)
wdlc2, dR2 = −
(
lr2 + lc2 + la
2lr2 + la
)
wdlc1
A.6 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
When w is fixed : Totally differentiate (1.78) we get:
dR1 =
lc1
lc1 + lc2
p2(−l−
1
2
r1 dlr1 − l−
1
2
r2 dlr2) +
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc1
− lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)dlc2
(A-33)
Applying first order conditions of warlord 1 in to (A-33) we get:
dR1 = −(1+γ1)(p1l−
1
2
r1 −w)dlr1−(1+γ2)(p1l−
1
2
r2 −w)dlr2+(1+γ1)wdlc1−(1+γ2)wdlc2 (A-34)
Totally differentiate two budget constraints we get:
(p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w)dlr1 = wdlc1, (p1l−
1
2
r2 − w)dlr2 = wdlc2 (A-35)
Then, substituting (A-35) in to (A-34) we get:
dR1 = −(1 + γ1)wdlc1 − (1 + γ2)wdlc2 + (1 + γ1)wdlc1 − (1 + γ2)wdlc2
= −2(1 + γ2)wdlc2
(A-36)
When w is endogenous : Totally differentiate two budget constraints we get:
(p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w)dlr1 = (lr1 + lc1)dw + wdlc1, (p1l−
1
2
r2 − w)dlr2 = (lr2 + lc2)dw + wdlc2 (A-37)
Then, substituting (A-37) in to (A-34) we get:
dR1 = −(1 + γ1)[(lr1 + lc1)dw + wdlc1]− (1 + γ2)[(lr2 + lc2)dw + wdlc2] + (1 + γ1)wdlc1
− (1 + γ2)wdlc2 = −2(1 + γ1)(lr1 + lc1)dw − 2(1 + γ2)wdlc2
(A-38)
Totally differentiate labor market equilibrium condition we get:
dlr1 + dlr2 + dlc1 + dlc2 + dla = 0 (A-39)
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Substituting (A-37) and value of dla in to (A-39) we get:
(dlc1 + dlc2) +
2(lr1 + lc1)
p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w
dw +
w
p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w
(dlc1 + dlc2)− 2la
w
dw = 0[
2(lr1 + lc1)
p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w
− 2la
w
]
dw = − p1l
− 1
2
r1
p1l
− 1
2
r1 − w
(dlc1 + dlc2)
2[w(lr1 + lc1)− la(p1l−
1
2
r1 − w)]dw = −wp1l−
1
2
r1 (dlc1 + dlc2)
Γdw = −wp1l−
1
2
r1 (dlc1 + dlc2),
(A-40)
where Γ = 2[w(lr1 + lc1)− la(p1l−
1
2
r1 − w)] < 0, for stability of excess demand function for
labor.
103
APPENDIX B
B.1 DERIVATION OF ∂I i/∂lci:
∂I i
∂lci
= wi.2l
1
2
ri
[
− p2
wi
.
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
]
+
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
rj) +
lcj
lci + lcj
p2
[
−2p2
wj
.
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
]
− wi
= − lcjp2
(lci + lcj)2
2l
1
2
ri +
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
rj)−
2p22
wj
.
lcilcj
(lci + lcj)3
− wi
=
lcj
(lci + lcj)2
p2(yi + yj − 2l
1
2
ri − 2l
1
2
rj)−
2p22
wj
.
lcilcj
(lci + lcj)3
− wi
(B-1)
B.2 DERIVATION OF (2.12):
From (2.11) we get two reaction functions of the two countries as follows:
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)−
2p22
w2
.
lc1lc2
(lc1 + lc2)3
= w1 (B-2)
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)2
p2(y1 + y2 − 2l
1
2
r1 − 2l
1
2
r2)−
2p22
w1
.
lc1lc2
(lc1 + lc2)3
= w2 (B-3)
From (B-2) and (B-3) we can derive the followings:
2p22
w2
.
lc1
(lc1 + lc2)3
+
w1
lc2
=
2p22
w1
.
lc2
(lc1 + lc2)3
+
w2
lc1
⇒ 2p
2
2
(lc1 + lc2)3
(
lc1
w2
− lc2
w1
)
=
(
w2
lc1
− w1
lc2
)
⇒ 2p
2
2
(lc1 + lc2)3
(
w1lc1 − w2lc2
w1w2
)
=
w2lc2 − w1lc1
lc1lc2
⇒ (w1lc1 − w2lc2)
[
2p22
(lc1 + lc2)3w1w2
+
1
lc1lc2
]
= 0
⇒ w1lc1 − w2lc2 = 0⇒ lc2 = w1
w2
lc1
(B-4)
B.3 DERIVATION OF (2.14):
If p1 = p2 = p,
lr1 = lr2 =
(
p
w1 + w2
)2
, lc1 =
w2
w1
lc2 =
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B
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where B = p(y1 + y2 − 6p/(w1 + w2)).
Then from (2.13) and (2.14) we get:
w2
(w1 + w2)2
B +
(
p
w1 + w2
)2
+
p2aλ
2
1V1
w21
− L1 = w1
(w1 + w2)2
B +
(
p
w1 + w2
)2
+
p2aλ
2
2V2
w22
− L2
⇒ L1 − w2
(w1 + w2)2
B − a1
w21
= L2 − w1
(w1 + w2)2
B − a2
w22
⇒ (L1 − L2) + B
(w1 + w2)2
(w1 − w2) +
(
a2
w22
− a1
w21
)
= 0,
(B-5)
where a1 = p
2
aλ
2
1V1, and a2 = p
2
aλ
2
2V2
B.4 DERIVATION OF (2.16) AND (2.17):
Totally differentiate (2.13) and using the symmetry (i.e. w1 = w2 = w, and
p1 = p2 = p) we get:
B
4w2
dw2 − B
4w2
dw1 − B
4w2
dw2 +
dB
4w
+
p
w2
dp1 − p
w3
dw1 − p
2
2w2
dp2 − p
2
w3
dw2 +
p2
w3
dw1 +
p2
4w3
dw1
+
p2
4w3
dw2 − 2a
w3
dw1 = 0⇒ p
w2
dp1 − p
2w2
dp2 −
(
B
4w2
+
p2
4w2
+
2a
w3
)
dw1 − p
2
4w3
dw2 = 0
(B-6)
where
dB = −4p
w
dp1 +
Bw + p2
wp
dp2 +
3p2
2w2
dw1 +
3p2
2w2
dw2
Substituting dB in to (B-6) and rearranging we get:
α1dw1 + α2dw2 = β1dp1 + γ1dp2, (B-7)
where
α1 =
B
4w2
+
p2
4w3
+
2a
w3
− 3p
2
8w3
=
p(2wy − 3p)
4w3
− p
2
8w3
+
2a
w3
=
2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a
8w3
α2 =
p2
4w3
− 3p
2
8w3
= − p
2
8w3
β1 =
p
w2
− p
w2
= 0
γ1 =
Bw + p2
4w2p
− p
2w2
=
p(2wy − 3p) + p2 − 2p2
4w2p
=
wy − 2p
2w2
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Similarly, totally differentiate (2.14) we can get:
α3dw1 + α4dw2 = β2dp1 + γ2dp2, (B-8)
where α3 = α2, α4 = α1, β2 = β1 and γ2 = γ1 (because of symmetry).
B.5 DERIVATION OF dwi/dp1 and dwi/dp2 (i = 1, 2):
From (2.16) and (2.17) we get: α1 α2
α3 α4

 dw1
dw2
 =
 β1
β2
 dp1 +
 γ1
γ2
 dp2 (B-9)
Now applying Cramer’s rule from (B-9) we get:
∆
dw1
dp1
= (β1α4 − β2α2)
∆
dw2
dp1
= (β2α1 − β1α3)
∆
dw1
dp2
= (γ1α4 − γ2α2)
∆
dw2
dp2
= (γ2α1 − γ1α3)
Note, ∆ = α1α4 − α2α3 = α21 − α22 = (α1 + α2)(α1 − α2) = Λ(p(2wy − 3p) + 8a)/16w6 > 0
(for Walrasian stability of the labor market), where Λ = p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a > 0 (as
∆ > 0, and (2wy − 3p) > 0 which follows from lc = p(2wy − 3p)/4w2 > 0).
B.6 EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS:
B.6.1 Derivation of dlc/dp1:
Under symmetry (i.e., w1 = w2 = w) and p1 = p2 = p the change in wage rate with
respect to p1 is:
∆
dw
dp1
= 0
Under symmetry the conflict efforts of each country is given by:
lc =
p2
4w
(2y − 4p1
w
+
p2
w
) =
p2(2wy − 4p1 + p2)
4w2
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Then,
dlc
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp1
=
∂lc
∂p1
= − p
w2
(B-10)
B.6.2 Derivation of dlc1/dp11:
If the price of period 1 in country 1 (p11) changes only, then from (2.16) we get:
β11 =
2p1
w21
− 2p2w2
w21(w1 + w2)
− 2p2w2
w1(w1 + w2)2
=
2p
w2
− p
w2
− p
2w2
=
p
2w2
,
and from (2.17) we get:
β12 = − 2p2
(w1 + w2)2
= − p
2w2
,
Then,
dw1
dp11
= − dw2
dp11
=
β11(α1 + α2)
∆
=
β11
(α1 − α2)
where
α1 − α2 = 2p(2wy − 3p)− p
2 + 16a
8w3
− p
2
8w3
=
p(2wy − 3p) + 8a
4w3
> 0.
Note, (2wy − 3p) > 0 as lc = p(2wy − 3p)/4w2 > 0.
Then,
dw1
dp11
= − dw2
dp11
=
2pw
p(2wy − 3p) + 8a.
From (2.18) we can write,
dlc1
dp11
=
∂lc1
∂p11
+
∂lc1
∂w1
dw1
dp11
+
∂lc1
∂w2
dw2
dp11
, (B-11)
where
∂lc1
∂p11
= − 2p2
w1(w1 + w2)
= − p
2w2
∂lc1
∂w1
= − 2Bw2
(w1 + w2)3
+
p2w2
(w1 + w2)2
[
2(p1 − p2)(w21 + 2w1w2) + 2p1w21
w21(w1 + w2)
2
+
4p2
(w1 + w2)2
]
= −p(2wy − 3p)
4w3
+
3p2
8w3
=
9p2 − 4pwy
8w3
,
and
∂lc1
∂w2
=
B(w1 − w2)
(w1 + w2)3
+
p2w2
(w1 + w2)2
[
(p1 − p2)(w21 + 2w1w2) + 2p1w22
w21(w1 + w2)
2
+
4p2
(w1 + w2)2
]
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=
3p2
8w3
.
Then,
dlc1
dp11
=
∂lc1
∂p11
+
dw1
dp11
(
∂lc1
∂w1
− ∂lc1
∂w2
)
= − p
2w2
+
2pw
8a+ p(2wy − 3p)
(
9p2 − 4pwy
8w3
− 3p
2
8w3
)
= − p
2w2
− p
2(2wy − 3p)
2w2[8a+ p(2wy − 3p)] < 0
(B-12)
B.6.3 Derivation of dlc2/dp11:
From (2.19) we can write,
dlc2
dp11
=
∂lc2
∂p11
+
∂lc2
∂w1
dw1
dp11
+
∂lc2
∂w2
dw2
dp11
(B-13)
Using the above derivations we can write (B-13) as follows:
dlc2
dp11
=
∂lc2
∂p11
+
dw1
dp11
(
∂lc2
∂w1
− ∂lc2
∂w2
)
= − p
2w2
+
2pw
8a+ p(2wy − 3p)
(
3p2
8w3
− 9p
2 − 4pwy
8w3
)
= − p
2w2
+
p2(2wy − 3p)
2w2[8a+ p(2wy − 3p)] =
−8ap
2w2[8a+ p(2wy − 3p)] < 0
(B-14)
B.6.4 Derivation of dlc/dp2:
Under symmetry the change in wage rate with respect to p2 is:
dw
dp2
=
γ1(α1 − α2)
∆
=
γ1
α1 + α2
,
where
γ1 =
wy − 2p
2w2
, α1 + α2 =
p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a
4w3
=
Λ
4w3
> 0
Thus,
dw
dp2
=
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
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Then,
dlc
dp2
=
∂lc
∂p2
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp2
=
wy − p
2w2
+
p(3p− wy)
2w3
.
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
=
wy − p
2w2
+
p(3p− wy)(wy − p) + p2(wy − p)− 2p3
w2Λ
=
wy − p
2w2Λ
[Λ + 2p(3p− wy) + 2p2]− 2p
3
w2Λ
=
wy − p
2w2Λ
[p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a+ 2p(3p− wy) + 2p2]− 2p
3
w2Λ
=
wy − p
2w2Λ
[8a+ 4p2]− 2p
3
w2Λ
=
(wy − p)(8a+ 4p2)− 4p3
2w2Λ
=
4a(wy − p) + p2(2wy − 3p)
w2Λ
> 0
(B-15)
B.6.5 Derivation of dlc1/dp21:
If the price of period 2 in country 1 (p21) changes only, then from (2.16) we get:
γ11 =
w2B
p2(w1 + w2)2
+
2p2w
2
2
w1(w1 + w2)3
− 2w2
w1(w1 + w2)
(
p1
w1
− w2p2
w1(w1 + w2)
)
=
B
4pw
+
p
4w2
− p
2w2
=
2wy − 3p
4w2
− p
4w2
=
wy − 2p
2w2
,
and from (2.17) we get:
γ12 =
2p2w2
(w1 + w2)3
− 2p2w1
(w1 + w2)3
=
p
4w2
− p
4w2
= 0
Then,
dw1
dp21
=
γ11α4
∆
=
w(wy − 2p)[2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a]
Ω
,
dw2
dp21
= −γ11α3
∆
=
w(wy − 2p)3p2
Ω
where Ω = Λ(p(2wy − 3p) + 8a) > 0.
From (2.18) we get,
dlc1
dp21
=
∂lc1
∂p21
+
∂lc1
∂w1
dw1
dp21
+
∂lc1
∂w2
dw2
dp21
, (B-16)
where
∂lc1
∂p21
=
w2B
(w1 + w2)2p2
+
2p21w
2
2
(w1 + w2)3w1
=
wy − p
2w2
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Then,
dlc1
dp21
=
∂lc1
∂p21
+
γ11
∆
(
α4
∂lc1
∂w1
− α3 ∂lc1
∂w2
)
=
wy − p
2w2
+
8w4(wy − 2p)
Ω
[
2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a
8w3
.
p(9p− 4wy)
8w3
+
p2
8w3
.
3p2
8w3
]
=
wy − p
2w2
+
p(wy − 2p)
Ω
[(2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a)(9p− 4wy) + 3p3]
8w2
=
wy − p
8w2Ω
[4Ω + (2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a)(9p− 4wy) + 3p4]
− p
2
8w2Ω
[(2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a)(9p− 4wy) + 3p3]
=
wy − p
2w2Ω
[(p3(2wy − 3p) + 12p2a+ 8a(p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a)]
+
p2
4w2Ω
[(2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a)− 3p(p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a)]
=
p2
2w2Ω
(p(2wy − 3p) + 8a)(wy − 2p) + p
2(2wy − 3p) + 16a(wy − p)
4w2Ω
(p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a)
+
8p2a(wy − p)
4w2Ω
=
4p2(p(2wy − 3p) + 8a)(wy − 2p) + Θ
4w2Ω
,
(B-17)
where Ω = (p(2wy − 3p) + 8a)Λ > 0,
Θ = [p2(2wy − 3p) + 16a(wy − p)](p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a) + 8p2a(wy − p) =
[p2(2wy − 3p) + 16a(wy − p)]Λ + 8p2a(wy − p) > 0.
B.6.6 Derivation of dlc2/dp21:
From (2.19) we get,
dlc2
dp21
=
∂lc2
∂p21
+
∂lc2
∂w1
dw1
dp21
+
∂lc2
∂w2
dw2
dp21
, (B-18)
where
∂lc2
∂p21
=
2p22(w2 − w1)
(w1 + w2)3
= 0.
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Then,
dlc2
dp21
= 0 +
γ11
∆
(α4
∂lc2
∂w1
− α3 ∂lc2
∂w2
)
=
8w4(wy − 2p)
Ω
[
2p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 16a
8w3
.
3p2
8w3
+
p2
8w3
.
p(9p− 4wy)
8w3
]
=
p2(wy − 2p)(8pwy − 3p2 + 48a)
8w2Ω
=
p2(p(2wy − 3p) + 6pwy + 48a)(wy − 2p)
8w2Ω
(B-19)
B.6.7 Derivation of dlc/dp:
Under symmetry the change in wage rate with respect to permanent change in
resource price will be:
dw
dp
=
γ1
α1 + α2
=
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
In this case,
lc =
p(2wy − 3p)
4w2
,
∂lc
∂p
=
wy − 3p
2w2
,
∂lc
∂w
=
p(3p− wy)
2w3
Then,
dlc
dp
=
∂lc
∂p
+
∂lc
∂w
dw
dp
=
wy − 3p
2w2
+
p(3p− wy)
2w3
.
2w(wy − 2p)
Λ
=
wy − 3p
2w2Λ
[Λ− 2p(wy − 2p)]
=
wy − 3p
2w2Λ
[p(2wy − 3p)− p2 + 8a− 2pwy + 4p2)]
=
4a(wy − 3p)
w2Λ
(B-20)
B.7 UNCERTAIN FUTURE SANCTION
When two countries are symmetric so that w1 = w2 = w, then
D = (θp′2 + (1− θ)p2)
2wy − 4p1
w
+
θ(p′2)
2 + (1− θ)p22
w
= (p2 + θ(p
′
2 − p2))
2wy − 4p1
w
+
p22 + θ((p
′
2)
2 − p22)
w
= (p2 + θ(p
′
2 − p2))
2wy − 3p1
w
+
p22 + θ((p
′
2)
2 − p22)
w
− (p2 + θ(p
′
2 − p2))p1)
w
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If in initial equilibrium p1 = p2, then
D = (p2 + θ(p
′
2 − p2))
2wy − 3p1
w
+
θ(p′2 − p2)(p′2 + p2)
w
− θ(p
′
2 − p2)p1
w
= (p2 + θ(p
′
2 − p2))
2wy − 3p1
w
+
θ(p′2 − p2)p′2
w
=
p2(2wy − 3p1)
w
+
θ(p′2 − p2)(2wy − 3p1 + p′2)
w
Then the equilibrium war efforts of each country is:
l˜c =
p(2wy − 3p1) + θ(p′2 − p2)(2wy − 3p1 + p′2)
4w2
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APPENDIX C
Table 3.1: List of Civil Wars: 1960-2008             
         
Country War years Country War years Country War years 
AFGHANISTAN 1978-89 HAITI 1991-95 PHILIPPINES 1972- 
AFGHANISTAN 1990-02 HAITI 2004-04 ROMANIA 1989-89 
AFGHANISTAN 2003- INDIA* 1960- RUSSIA 1994-96 
ALGERIA 1962-62 INDIA 1965- RUSSIA 1999-05 
ALGERIA 1991-00 INDIA 1984-88 RWANDA 1962-65 
ANGOLA 1975-02 INDIA 1989- RWANDA 1990-94 
ANGOLA 1992-02 INDONESIA* 1960-60 RWANDA 1997-02 
ARGENTINA 1974-77 INDONESIA 1975-98 SENEGAL 1989-03 
AZERBAIJAN 1991-94 INDONESIA 1999-05 SIERRA LEONE 1991-02 
BANGLADESH 1976-97 IRAN 1978-79 SIERRA LEONE 1997-02 
BOSNIA 1992-95 IRAN 1980-93 SOMALIA 1982-91 
BURUNDI 1972-73 IRAQ 1961-74 SOMALIA 1991-97 
BURUNDI 1988-88 IRAQ 1994-96 SOMALIA 2001-02 
BURUNDI 1993-08 IVORYCOST 2002-04 SOMALIA 2006-08 
CAMBODIA 1970-75 JEORGIA 1992-94 SOUTH AFRICA 1983-94 
CAMBODIA 1978-91 JORDAN 1970-70 SRI LANKA 1971-71 
CAF 1996-97 LAOS 1960-73 SRI LANKA 1983- 
CAF 2001- LEBANON 1975-90 SUDAN 1963-72 
CHAD 1965-79 LIBERIA 1989-96 SUDAN 1983- 
CHAD 1980-88 LIBERIA 2000-03 SYRIA 1979-81 
CHAD 1997-02 MALI 1989-95 TAJIKISTAN 1992-97 
CHAD 2005-06 MOLDOVA 1992-92 THAILAND 1974-81 
CHINA 1991-99 MOROCCO 1975-88 THAILAND 2003-05 
COLOMBIA 1963- MOZAMBIQUE 1976-92 TURKEY 1977-80 
CONGO 1998-99 MYANMAR 1968- TURKEY 1984- 
CONGO 2002-03 MYANMAR 1983- UGANDA 1980-88 
CROATIA 1992-95 MYANMAR 1988- UGANDA 1993- 
CYPRUS 1974-74 NEPAL 1960-62 UK 1969-98 
DJIBOUTI 1991-94 NEPAL 1996-06 VIETNAM, S. 1960-64 
DOMINICAN REP. 1965-65 NICARAGUA 1978-79 YEMEN ARAB REP. 1962-69 
DRC 1960-65 NICARAGUA 1981-89 YEMEN 1986-86 
DRC 1977-78 NIGERIA 1966-70 YEMEN  1994-94 
DRC 1996-97 NIGERIA 1980-80 YEMEN  2004-05 
DRC 1998-01 NIGERIA 2004-04 YEMEN 2007-07 
EL SALVADOR 1979-92 PAKISTAN 1971-71 YUGOSLAVIA 1991-91 
ETHIOPIA 1974-92 PAKISTAN 1973-77 YUGOSLAVIA 1998-99 
ETHIOPIA 1994- PAKISTAN 1993-99 ZIMBABWE 1967-68 
GEORGIA 1992-94 PAKISTAN 2004-06 ZIMBABWE 1972-79 
GUATEMALA 1965-95 P. N.G. 1988-98 ZIMBABWE 1983-87 
GUINEA  2000-02 PERU 1980-99     
GUINEA BISSAU 1998-99 PHILIPPINES 1968-     
                            Note: DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo, CAF-Central African Republic. * Wars started before 1960. 
  
113
Table 3.2: List of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Data Source 
War duration (in year) COW, UCPD, Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
War end (dummy) COW, UCPD, Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Sanction (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Total economic embargo (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Aid end (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Trade sanction (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Other sanctions (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Arms embargo (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Multi-lateral sanction (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Unilateral sanction (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott's (2008), TIES, GIGA 
Population (in thousands) WB, Pen World Table 7.1 
Per capita GDP (2005 constant $)* WB, Pen World Table 7.1 
Per capita GDP in PPP( international $)* WB, Pen World Table 7.1 
Gini-efficient (index, 0-100)* WB 
Male secondary school enrollment ratio* WB 
Army size (per 1000 population) Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Battle death per year Escriba`-Folch (2010), UCPD 
polity2 (index, -10 to +10) Polity IV project, CSP 
Mountainous area (% of total land) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2004) 
Forest area (% of total land)* WB 
Ethnic fractionalization (index, 0-1) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2003) 
Religious fractionalization (index, 0-1) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2003) 
Number of border Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Primary commodity exports (% of GDP)* Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2005) 
Oil rent (% of GDP, interpolated)* WB 
Mineral exporter (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2005) 
Oil exporter (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2005) 
Oil production per capita (in barrels)* Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Diamond production per capita (in carats)* Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Diamond production per square kilometer (in 
carats)* 
Olsson (2007), Geology.com 
Contraband (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
Military intervention (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010) 
External intervention (dummy) Cunningham (2010) 
Ethnic war (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2004) 
Sons of civil war (dummy) Escriba`-Folch (2010), Fearon (2004) 
Post-cold war (dummy) = 0 if the year is before 1990, =1 if 1990 and after 
Non-member of UNSC = 0 if member of SC during the war, 1 = otherwise 
Notes: * interpolated for missing values, COW-Correlates of War, UCPD-Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TIES-
Threat and Imposition of Sanctions, GIGA-German Institute of Global and Area Studies, WB-World Bank, UNSC-
United Nation Security Council.  
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Table 3.3a: Effects of Sanctions on Civil War Duration
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sanction 0.384* 0.341* 0.339* 0.493** 0.513** 0.560** 0.681*** 0.679*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of population  -0.319*** -0.383*** -0.391*** -0.250*** -0.309*** -0.380*** -0.303*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.025 -0.215* -0.343*** -0.391*** -0.349*** -0.417*** -0.425*** 
  (0.79) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male secondary school 
enrolment 
  0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil rent to GDP    0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per 
capita 
   2.829*** 2.555*** 2.196** 2.454*** 3.052*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Contraband    -1.336*** -1.206*** -1.316*** -1.322*** -1.376*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war     -1.284*** -1.283*** -1.404*** -1.655*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size      -0.038 -0.048** -0.054** 
      (0.11) (0.05) (0.03) 
Army size sq.      0.0003 0.0003 0.0005* 
      (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) 
Log of battle death per 
year 
      -0.196** -0.189** 
       (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of border        -0.100* 
        (0.10) 
Constant -2.275*** 0.452 2.029** 2.812*** 1.786* 2.359** 4.820*** 4.582*** 
 (0.00) (0.61) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln (p) -0.137* -0.019 -0.019 0.080 0.152* 0.185** 0.235*** 0.232*** 
 (0.07) (0.81) (0.82) (0.30) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 1013 1013 943 940 927 927 927 927 
LL -193.3 -183.4 -165.0 -145.6 -136.2 -134.5 -131.4 -130.0 
AIC 392.6 376.7 342.0 309.3 292.5 292.9 288.9 288.0 
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3.3b: Effects of Sanctions on Civil War Duration: Hazard Rates
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sanction 1.468* 1.407* 1.403* 1.636** 1.670** 1.751** 1.975*** 1.973*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of population  0.727*** 0.682*** 0.676*** 0.779*** 0.734*** 0.684*** 0.738*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log of GDP per capita  1.025 0.807* 0.709*** 0.676*** 0.706*** 0.659*** 0.654*** 
  (0.79) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male secondary school enrolment   1.017*** 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.015*** 1.017*** 1.016*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil rent to GDP    1.027*** 1.028*** 1.030*** 1.035*** 1.043*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per capita    16.935*** 12.866*** 8.989** 11.632*** 21.152*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Contraband    0.263*** 0.299*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.253*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war     0.277*** 0.277*** 0.246*** 0.191*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size      0.963 0.953** 0.948** 
      (0.11) (0.05) (0.03) 
Army size sq.      1.000 1.000 1.000* 
      (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) 
Log of battle death per year       0.822** 0.828** 
       (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of border        0.905* 
N 1013 1013 943 940 927 927 927 927 
LL -193.3 -183.4 -165.0 -145.6 -136.2 -134.5 -131.4 -130.0 
AIC 392.6 376.7 342.0 309.3 292.5 292.9 288.9 288.0 
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check: Other Controls
 
 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Sanction 0.682*** (0.005) 0.683*** (0.005) 0.698*** (0.004) 0.690*** (0.005) 0.688*** (0.005) 0.703*** (0.007) 
Log of population -0.333*** (0.006) -0.338*** (0.005) -0.341*** (0.005) -0.289** (0.025) -0.317** (0.020) -0.357** (0.014) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.354** (0.012) -0.340** (0.021) -0.351** (0.021) -0.444** (0.010) -0.422** (0.016) -0.401** (0.027) 
Male secondary school 
enrolment 
0.0140** (0.017) 0.0143** (0.015) 0.0146** (0.016) 0.0153** (0.012) 0.0147** (0.018) 0.0139** (0.036) 
Oil rent to GDP 0.0409*** (0.000) 0.0401*** (0.000) 0.0409*** (0.000) 0.0427*** (0.000) 0.0423*** (0.000) 0.0408*** (0.000) 
Diamond production per 
capita 
3.073*** (0.002) 2.657** (0.027) 2.702** (0.025) 2.941** (0.023) 2.769** (0.034) 2.562** (0.049) 
Contraband -1.341*** (0.000) -1.422*** (0.000) -1.479*** (0.000) -1.476*** (0.000) -1.516*** (0.000) -1.447*** (0.000) 
Son of civil war -1.574*** (0.000) -1.570*** (0.000) -1.561*** (0.000) -1.733*** (0.000) -1.645*** (0.000) -1.540*** (0.001) 
Army size -0.0533** (0.028) -0.0566** (0.021) -0.0587** (0.018) -0.0529** (0.038) -0.0527** (0.041) -0.0447* (0.098) 
Army size sq. 0.000468 (0.107) 0.000510* (0.081) 0.000528* (0.074) 0.000416 (0.184) 0.000409 (0.195) 0.000347 (0.290) 
Log of battle death per year -0.180** (0.025) -0.169** (0.041) -0.172** (0.040) -0.155* (0.069) -0.150* (0.082) -0.198** (0.028) 
Number of border -0.0894 (0.138) -0.0949 (0.120) -0.0982 (0.111) -0.114* (0.073) -0.0982 (0.129) -0.0465 (0.525) 
Gini index -0.00963 (0.509) -0.00796 (0.595) -0.0105 (0.494) -0.00997 (0.527) -0.0118 (0.467) -0.0114 (0.513) 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.0865 (0.969) -0.130 (0.954) 1.133 (0.651) 0.850 (0.734) -0.105 (0.967) 
Ethnic fractionalization sq.   0.501 (0.826) 0.623 (0.787) -0.634 (0.806) -0.342 (0.894) 0.414 (0.874) 
Religious fractionalization     -1.096 (0.848) -1.867 (0.760) -1.979 (0.747) -3.655 (0.562) 
Religious fractionalization sq.     0.238 (0.977) 1.078 (0.903) 1.305 (0.883) 5.264 (0.572) 
Mountain        -0.00707 (0.228) -0.00650 (0.269) -0.00653 (0.275) 
Forests       -0.00420 (0.487) -0.00363 (0.554) -0.00497 (0.455) 
External intervention         -0.156 (0.625) -0.166 (0.614) 
Ethnic war           -0.324 (0.290) 
Polity2           -0.00387 (0.874) 
Constant 4.717*** (0.002) 4.442*** (0.006) 5.089** (0.016) 5.280** (0.017) 5.443** (0.014) 6.038*** (0.009) 
Log(p) 0.252*** (0.003) 0.256*** (0.003) 0.256*** (0.003) 0.261*** (0.002) 0.260*** (0.002) 0.296*** (0.001) 
N 857  857  857  857  850  838  
Log likelihood -121.7  -121.4  -121.2  -120.4  -120.4  -113.9  
AIC 273.4  276.8  280.4  282.8  284.7  275.8  
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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Table 3.5: Robustness Check: Alternative Definitions of Resource Abundance
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sanction 0.679*** 0.708*** 0.597*** 0.557** 0.618*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log of population -0.303*** -0.433*** -0.345*** -0.309*** -0.296** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.425*** -0.399*** -0.382*** -0.326*** -0.390*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Male secondary school enrolment 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per capita 3.052*** 2.822*** 2.877*** 2.483*** 1.968** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
Contraband -1.376*** -1.331*** -1.219*** -1.315*** -1.556*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war -1.655*** -1.158*** -1.409*** -1.399*** -1.372*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size -0.054** -0.056** -0.047* -0.055** -0.053** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Army size sq. 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.08) (0.28) (0.12) (0.03) (0.07) 
Log of battle death per year -0.189** -0.168** -0.186** -0.157* -0.143* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Number of border -0.100* -0.019 -0.036 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.10) (0.80) (0.55) (0.87) (0.92) 
Oil rent to GDP 0.042***     
 (0.00)     
Oil production per capita  13.519**    
  (0.02)    
Oil exporter   0.872***   
   (0.01)   
Mineral exporter    0.688**  
    (0.02)  
Primary exports to GDP ratio     3.450*** 
     (0.00) 
Constant 4.582*** 5.077*** 4.414*** 3.539** 3.251** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
Log (p) 0.232*** 0.245*** 0.212** 0.193** 0.195** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
N 927 863 927 927 912 
LL -130.0 -123.0 -135.8 -136.6 -131.3 
AIC 288.0 274.0 299.6 301.2 290.6 
        p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3.6: Different Parametric Models and Logit Model
Variable Wei-bull Exponential Gompertz Cox 
proportional 
Logit 
Sanction 0.679*** 0.652*** 0.666*** 0.620*** 0.732*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log of population -0.303*** -0.225** -0.283** -0.244** -0.221* 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.425*** -0.360*** -0.410*** -0.376*** -0.413*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male secondary school enrolment 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Oil rent to GDP 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.047*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per capita 3.052*** 2.750*** 2.919*** 2.865*** 3.201*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Contraband -1.376*** -1.233*** -1.362*** -1.295*** -1.237*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war -1.655*** -1.413*** -1.624*** -1.389*** -1.418*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size -0.054** -0.044* -0.051** -0.044* -0.048* 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Army size sq. 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) 
Log of battle death per year -0.189** -0.135* -0.159** -0.128* -0.123 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.13) 
Number of border -0.100* -0.101* -0.096 -0.097 -0.123* 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) 
Constant 4.582*** 3.589** 4.484***  4.047*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Log (p) 0.232***     
 (0.01)     
Gamma   0.027   
   (0.10)   
N 927 927 927 927 934 
LL -130.0 -133.5 -132.2 -332.3 -267.8 
AIC 288.0 293.0 292.5 688.5 561.5 
        p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  
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Table 3.7: Endogeneity of Sanctions
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
     Sanction  Sanction        
Sanction 0.687*** (0.003) 0.679*** (0.003)     1.361** (0.037) 1.295** (0.050) 0.730*** (0.002) 
Log of population -0.307*** (0.009) -0.303*** (0.010) 0.381*** (0.000) 0.502*** (0.000) -0.385*** (0.003) -0.383*** (0.003) -0.358*** (0.005) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.424*** (0.001) -0.425*** (0.001)           
Log of initial GDP per capita     0.538*** (0.000) 0.478*** (0.000) -0.443*** (0.004) -0.440*** (0.005) -0.407*** (0.007) 
Male secondary school 
enrolment 
0.0159*** (0.003) 0.0160*** (0.002) -0.0207*** (0.000) -0.0194*** (0.000) 0.0165*** (0.006) 0.0164*** (0.006) 0.0157*** (0.009) 
Oil rent to GDP 0.0425*** (0.000) 0.0423*** (0.000) -0.0376*** (0.000) -0.0346*** (0.000) 0.0417*** (0.000) 0.0414*** (0.000) 0.0394*** (0.000) 
Diamond production per capita 3.073*** (0.001) 3.052*** (0.002) 2.974** (0.025) 2.556* (0.052) 1.980 (0.123) 2.104* (0.096) 2.389* (0.050) 
Contraband -1.381*** (0.000) -1.376*** (0.000) 0.810*** (0.000) 0.923*** (0.000) -1.569*** (0.000) -1.561*** (0.000) -1.446*** (0.000) 
Son of civil war -1.673*** (0.000) -1.655*** (0.000) 0.407* (0.081) 0.325 (0.166) -1.740*** (0.000) -1.731*** (0.000) -1.689*** (0.000) 
Army size -0.0539** (0.025) -0.0539** (0.025) 0.119*** (0.000) 0.130*** (0.000) -0.0598** (0.024) -0.0597** (0.027) -0.0509** (0.045) 
Army size sq. 0.000494* (0.082) 0.000494* (0.083) -0.00126*** (0.000) -0.00136*** (0.000) 0.000522 (0.107) 0.000518 (0.114) 0.000419 (0.177) 
Log of battle death per year -0.191** (0.015) -0.189** (0.017) 0.351*** (0.000) 0.329*** (0.000) -0.210** (0.021) -0.204** (0.025) -0.176** (0.039) 
Number of border -0.103* (0.091) -0.100* (0.096) 0.156*** (0.000) 0.144*** (0.001) -0.0820 (0.215) -0.0806 (0.223) -0.0691 (0.292) 
Non-imposed sanction threat 0.404 (0.701)             
Ethnic fractionalization     2.490 (0.136) 2.603 (0.120) -0.598 (0.789) -0.470 (0.833) -0.391 (0.861) 
Ethnic fractionalization sq.     -2.675 (0.107) -2.865* (0.084) 0.841 (0.714) 0.707 (0.758) 0.636 (0.782) 
Mountain      0.394** (0.033) 0.405** (0.030) -0.306 (0.234) -0.284 (0.265) -0.260 (0.304) 
Ethnic war     -0.00547 (0.167) -0.00773* (0.056) -0.00622 (0.232) -0.00613 (0.239) -0.00632 (0.224) 
Polity2     -0.0535*** (0.001) -0.0477*** (0.003) 0.0143 (0.545) 0.0140 (0.555) 0.0108 (0.644) 
Post-cold war     1.669*** (0.000) 1.577*** (0.000)       
Non-member of SC       0.687*** (0.001)       
Residual 1         -0.287 (0.307)     
Residual 2           -0.262 (0.364)   
Constant 4.634*** (0.002) 4.582*** (0.002) -13.21*** (0.000) -14.31*** (0.000) 5.764*** (0.002) 5.658*** (0.002) 5.001*** (0.003) 
Log (p) 0.233*** (0.005) 0.232*** (0.006)     0.233*** (0.006) 0.235*** (0.005) 0.242*** (0.004) 
Log (θ)   -14.29 (0.980)           
N 927  927  922  922  915  915  915  
LL -129.9  -130.0  -505.6  -500.3  -123.5  -123.7  -124.1  
AIC 289.9  290.0  1047.2  1038.5  287.1  287.3  286.2  
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =     0.00 Prob.>=chibar2 = 1.000 
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Table 3.8: Effects of Different Types of Sanctions on Civil War Duration
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total economic embargo 0.834** 0.568 0.381 0.536 0.701 0.647 0.921* 0.968** 
 (0.03) (0.15) (0.37) (0.22) (0.12) (0.15) (0.05) (0.04) 
Aid suspension 0.188 0.075 0.264 0.230 0.104 0.179 0.362 0.318 
 (0.55) (0.81) (0.42) (0.48) (0.75) (0.60) (0.29) (0.36) 
Trade sanction -0.074 0.003 0.026 0.560 0.500 0.506 0.362 0.390 
 (0.87) (1.00) (0.96) (0.26) (0.32) (0.32) (0.48) (0.45) 
Other sanctions -0.291 -0.157 -0.005 -0.151 -0.117 -0.100 0.090 0.156 
 (0.50) (0.72) (0.99) (0.74) (0.80) (0.83) (0.85) (0.74) 
Arms embargo 0.759*** 0.649** 0.474* 0.610** 0.686** 0.638** 0.619** 0.583** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Log of population  -0.282*** -0.343*** -0.352*** -0.194* -0.254** -0.331*** -0.266** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.022 -0.189 -0.318** -0.349*** -0.317** -0.402*** -0.416*** 
  (0.83) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Male secondary school 
enrolment 
  0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.012** 0.014** 0.013** 
   (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Oil rent to GDP    0.027*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per 
capita 
   2.780*** 2.494*** 2.217** 2.537*** 2.995*** 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Contraband    -1.354*** -1.227*** -1.295*** -1.244*** -1.281*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war     -1.295*** -1.286*** -1.419*** -1.644*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size      -0.031 -0.042* -0.047* 
      (0.20) (0.09) (0.06) 
Army size sq.      0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (0.38) (0.20) (0.17) 
Log of battle death per year       -0.209** -0.200** 
       (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of border        -0.085 
        (0.17) 
Constant -2.403*** 0.050 1.509 2.361** 1.104 1.696 4.363*** 4.196*** 
 (0.00) (0.96) (0.15) (0.04) (0.34) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log (p) -0.082 0.003 -0.002 0.090 0.167** 0.196** 0.255*** 0.251*** 
 (0.29) (0.97) (0.98) (0.26) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 997 997 930 928 915 915 915 915 
LL -183.8 -176.7 -160.7 -141.9 -132.8 -131.5 -128.4 -127.5 
AIC 381.6 371.3 341.4 309.8 293.7 295.1 290.8 290.9 
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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Table 3.9: Effects of Sanctions: Multi-lateral vs. Unilateral
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Multi-lateral sanctions 0.619** 0.524** 0.407 0.474* 0.555** 0.560** 0.614** 0.618** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Unilateral sanctions 0.070 0.078 0.176 0.445 0.374 0.485 0.667** 0.616** 
 (0.78) (0.77) (0.52) (0.12) (0.19) (0.11) (0.03) (0.05) 
Log of population  -0.316*** -0.377*** -0.394*** -0.247** -0.310*** -0.388*** -0.314*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.035 -0.200* -0.350*** -0.386*** -0.353*** -0.434*** -0.439*** 
  (0.71) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male secondary school 
enrolment 
  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil rent to GDP    0.027*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per 
capita 
   2.831*** 2.472*** 2.181** 2.500*** 3.026*** 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Contraband    -1.326*** -1.199*** -1.306*** -1.313*** -1.358*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war     -1.294*** -1.283*** -1.387*** -1.620*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size      -0.037 -0.049** -0.054** 
      (0.12) (0.05) (0.03) 
Army size sq.      0.000 0.000 0.000* 
      (0.26) (0.12) (0.09) 
Log of battle death per year       -0.189** -0.178** 
       (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of border        -0.092 
        (0.12) 
Constant -2.282*** 0.348 1.918** 2.883*** 1.747* 2.401** 4.958*** 4.673*** 
 (0.00) (0.69) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (p) -0.125 -0.013 -0.015 0.081 0.157* 0.187** 0.234*** 0.232*** 
 (0.10) (0.87) (0.85) (0.29) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 1013 1013 943 940 927 927 927 927 
LL -192.1 -182.6 -165.0 -146.0 -136.5 -134.8 -132.1 -130.8 
AIC 392.2 377.3 344.1 311.9 295.1 295.7 292.1 291.7 
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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Table 3.10: Effects of Different Types of Sanctions Separately
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total economic embargo 0.956**       
 (0.04)       
Aid suspension  0.284      
  (0.40)      
Trade sanction   0.296     
   (0.53)     
Other sanctions    0.402    
    (0.34)    
Arms embargo     0.649**   
     (0.02)   
Multilateral sanction      0.478*  
      (0.06)  
Unilateral sanction       0.428 
       (0.15) 
Log of population -0.270** -0.331*** -0.316*** -0.326*** -0.283** -0.276** -0.332*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.423*** -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.319** -0.374*** -0.437*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male secondary school enrolment 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014*** 0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Oil rent to GDP 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diamond production per capita 3.203*** 3.074*** 2.995*** 2.901*** 2.952*** 2.899*** 3.226*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contraband -1.121*** -1.158*** -1.168*** -1.170*** -1.286*** -1.259*** -1.218*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Son of civil war -1.680*** -1.578*** -1.608*** -1.595*** -1.650*** -1.662*** -1.627*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Army size -0.046* -0.053** -0.048** -0.047* -0.048* -0.042* -0.050** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Army size sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) 
Log of battle death per year -0.176** -0.163** -0.143* -0.152** -0.162** -0.141* -0.163** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Number of border -0.097 -0.086 -0.094 -0.091 -0.084 -0.102* -0.092 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) 
Constant 4.275*** 4.464*** 4.273*** 4.359*** 3.582** 3.769** 4.769*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log (p) 0.241*** 0.234*** 0.226*** 0.235*** 0.245*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 921 921 921 915 926 927 927 
LL -130.7 -132.3 -132.4 -132.0 -130.2 -132.7 -133.4 
AIC 289.5 292.6 292.8 292.1 288.5 293.4 294.7 
p values in parentheses: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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